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A US/India Model for China’s Ethnic Policies:
is the Cure Worse than the Disease?
Barry Sautman
Some scholars in China argue that minority rights inscribed in
law, such as ethnic regional autonomy and preferential policies,
must be reformed along liberal lines: minorities should be
“depoliticized” -- treated as cultural groups whose members have
only individual, not colleve, rights. They propose a “second
generation of ethnic policies” for China that they argue would
resemble policies in the United States and India. This article
shows, however, that the United States and India do not have the
features of ethnic equity and peace that they are supposed to
exemplify, as their minorities have subordinate, deteriorating
social positions and are generally disaffected. The choice for
China’s minorities need not be a binary of individual rights only
or no change in the present system. An expansion, rather than
contraction, of minority rights may instead create greater ethnic
equality and stability in China.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is often proclaimed the “world’s greatest
democracy,” although social scientists have concluded otherwise.1
India styles itself “the world’s largest democracy,” a sobriquet that
some Indians themselves challenge.2 In any case, the policy sets
that the two countries embody in their laws, regulations, and
practices expectedly attract attention from liberal-minded Chinese,
who assume that U.S. and Indian government policies are better
than their counterpart in the world’s largest one-party state, China.
Such an assumption has certainly characterized the important
ongoing discourse about China’s ethnic policies in recent years.
In a decade-long debate in China on whether to sharply
change the country’s system of ethnic laws and policies, prominent
scholars, such as Peking University sociologist Ma Rong – himself a
member of the Hui or Muslim Chinese ethnic minority – and
Tsinghua University economist Hu Angang, have sought a liberalist
“depoliticization” of minorities. They want ethnicity-related law
and practice to be pared, in order to de-emphasize collective rights
for members of China’s minority groups, subordinate ethnic identity
to national identity, and secure China’s territorial integrity. Their
argument is that diminished ethnic identity among minorities will
lessen hostility toward the Han majority, although studies elsewhere
have shown that high levels of ethnic identity and even political
activism among minorities in fact tend to increase their positivity
toward their countries’ ethnic majorities.3
1

The Democratic Barometer, using 100 empirical indicators to measure democratic
principles and functions of 30 “consolidated democracies” in 1995-2005, found that
Denmark (score: 88.3) ranked number one; the US (score: 74.9), ranked number ten.
University of Zurich, DENMARK, FINLAND, AND BELGIUM HAVE BEST DEMOCRACIES (2011),
http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/schweizerdemokratie/110115_MM_Demokrati
ebarometer_Europa_E_def.pdf. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index
2012,” which applied five procedural and substantive criteria to 165 countries, ranked
Norway
number
one
and
the
US
number
21,
https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034. See generally
Daniel A. Bell, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN EAST ASIAN
CONTEXT (2009) (discusses disjunctions between liberal democracy and ethnic rights.)
2
Sukhman Dhami, India Won’t Be ‘The World’s Largest Democracy’ Until It Upholds
Human Rights,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
(Mar.
29,
2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0329/India-won-t-be-the-world-slargest democracy-until-it-upholds-human-rights.
3
Fiona Kate Barlow et al., Rejection as a Call to Arms: Inter-racial Hostility and Dupport
for Political Action as Outcomes of Race-based Rejection in Majority and Minority Groups,
51 BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 167-77 (2012); Sylvia Chen, et al., Do
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Proponents of depoliticization hold that a “second generation”
of ethnic policies (di er dai minzu zhengce) would move away from
the official division of Chinese into 56 ethnic groups,4 the existing
low-level, legally-mandated ethnic regional autonomy (minzu quyu
zizhi) that aims for a modicum of ethnic minority leadership and
cultural preservation in minority areas,5 and preferential policies
(youhui zhengce) for minorities in such areas as university
admissions, family planning, hiring officials, and business loans.6
That change would render minorities strictly cultural entities, who
retain only whatever individual rights are provided Chinese citizens.
Scholars who favor depoliticization bolster their arguments
by citing India and the United States as successful models of
systems that supposedly do without the range of laws, regulations
and official practices related to ethnic relations that are found in
China. 7 Hu Angang, for example, contends that rising ethnic
consciousness threatens social stability. China, he claims, should
dissipate ethnic identity, strengthen national identity, and
depoliticize ethnic issues through institutional arrangements that do
not to allow anyone to claim to be representatives of local and
Whites Direct their Prejudice toward Strongly Identified Asians? 5 MIND MATTERS: THE
WESLEYAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 39-50 (2010) (discussing how stronger ethnic
identity among minorities may also correlate with more positive majority attitudes toward
minorities). See also Christopher Wolsko et al., Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of
Multicultural and Color-blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, No. 4, 635-54 (2000)(explicating
how increased differentiation of ethnic out-groups from ethnic in-groups actually increases
positivity toward the out-group.)
4
See generally Emily C. Hannum & Meiyan Wang, Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status, and
Social Welfare in China, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (Gillette
Hall & Harry Patrinos ed., 2010).
5
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhifa (中国人民共和国民族区域自
治法) [Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated
by National People's Congress, May 31, 1984, effective Oct. 1, 1984). See Haiting Zhang,
The Laws on the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions in China: Legal Norms and
Practices, 9 THE. LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV 249, 249-64 (2011)(discusses the law’s
deficiencies); Xia Chunli, From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law: A Constructivist
Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China, 14 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL ON MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS, 399-424 (2007).
6
See, e.g., Wang Tiezhi, Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minority Students in China’s
College/University Admission, 8 ASIAN ETHNICITY 149, 149-63 (2007); Gu Baochang et al.,
China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century, 33
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 129, 129-47 (2007).
7
See Ma Rong, Lijie Minzu Guanxi De Xinsilu Shaoshu Zuqun De Quzhengzhihua, 41
BEIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 122 (北 京 大 学 学 报 ), 122-33 (2004). See generally Barry
Sautman, Paved with Good Intentions: Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their
Consequences for China, 38 MODERN CHINA 10, 10-39 (2011).
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ethnic interests. He asserts that the United States government does
not recognize racial/ethnic corporatism or allow any ethnic group its
own autonomous territory. United States citizens’ identity thus has
no ethnic content. Because the United States emphasizes individual,
not group, rights and avoids linking gaps in citizens’ wealth, power,
employment and education to ethnic status, unity is assured and
individual conflicts do not evolve into ethnic conflicts. In China,
however, autonomous areas, together with their resources, are seen
as ethnic groups’ own property. Ethnic leaders view themselves as
the highest proponents of their group’s interests, vying to be its
spokespeople within a federal framework. Angang views this as
flawed, believing that no privileges, rights or duties should accrue
from ethnicity, all jurisdictions should be equal before the law, and
depoliticization should be used to promote ethnic amalgamation.8
Leading critics of depoliticization among China’s scholars,
such as ethnic Mongolian anthropologist and Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS) Deputy Secretary General Hao Shiyuan and
his CASS colleague Chen Jianyue, argue that while existing policies
give most minorities a solidly Chinese identity, the United States
and India are replete with ethnic problems and cannot be successful
models.9 China’s government, of course, also defends its policies10
8

Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe, Dierdai Minzu Zhengce: Cuijin Minzu Jiaorong Yiti He
Fanrong (第二代民族政策:促民族交融一体和繁荣一体)[the Second Generation Ethnic
Policy: Promoting Amalgamation and Prosperousness of Ethnicity], 32 XINJIANG SHIFAN
DAXUE XUEBAO (新 疆 范 大 学 学 报 ) [J OURNAL OF X INJIANG N ORMAL U NIVERSITY ]
(2011). Ma Rong discusses India and the U.S.; Hu and Hu also discuss Brazil. Hao
Shiyuan, Baxi Yindu Nengwei Zhongguo Minzu Shiwu Tigong Shime Jingyan Pingxi
Dierdai Minzu Zhengceshuo Zhisi [What ‘Experience’ Can Brazil and India Provide for
China in Dealing With Ethnic Issues?], RENWEI YU SHEHUI (人文与社会), (Aug. 22,
2012), http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/3465. See Tom Phillips, Brazil
Census Shows African-Brazilians in the Majority for the First Time, T HE G UARDIAN ,
(Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/17/brazilcensus-african-brazilians-majority/ (The 2010 census indicated 51% of Brazilians are
“mixed race” or black. White people, on average, earn 2.4 times what black people earn.).
Discrimination causes a substantial portion of Brazilian “racial” inequality. Stanley Bailey
et al., Measures of Race and the Analysis of Racial Inequality in Brazil, 42 S OCIAL
S CIENCE R ESEARCH 106 (2013).
9
Hao Shiyuan, Guoji Jingyan de Bijiao he Jiejian Bixu Shishi Qiushi: Ping Dierdai Minzu
Zhengce Shuo Zhisan (Shang) [Realistically seek truth in comparing and learning from
international experience: third comment on the second generation of ethnic policies (part
1)],
ZHONGGUO
MINZU
ZONGJIAO
WANG
(Mar.
2,
2012),
http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/293035-1.htm; see also Chen Jianyue,
Duominzu guojia he xieshehui de goujian yu minzu wenti de jueding [Construction of
Harmonious Society and solution of ethnicity complexity in Multi-Ethnic Country:
Commentary on Depoliticization And Deculturalization of Ethnic Problems], Shijie Minzu
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and attributes unrest to uneven development and, in Tibet, to
intervention by exiles and their foreign supporters. China’s
government additionally cites links between Uygur separatists and
external jihadist forces as the source of unrest in the northwestern
Uygur minority region of Xinjiang. Officials hold that problems
can be overcome by raising minority living standards.11 One official,
however, United Front Work Department (tongzhan bu) vice
director for the Tibet issue Zhu Weiqun, has floated proposals
loosely tied to depoliticization. He seeks to remove ethnic
indicators from identity cards, prevent the creation of more
autonomous areas, and promote mixed-ethnicity schools and
national education.12
Proposed liberalist changes in ethnic policies were criticized
at a 2012 gathering at CASS. Scholars saw them as rash, dangerous,
and naïve efforts to erase ethnic minorities as subjects bearing
political rights and quickly amalgamate (ronghe) ethnic groups.
They denounced efforts to implement a failed U.S. model of
assimilation – while ignoring China’s own experience – as
simplistic, and argued for the protection of minority rights by
expanding cultural justice (wenhua zhengyi). 13 Scholars who
conducted survey research on ethnic and national identity in China
(世界民族)[Worldwide Ethnicity] (2005). Many of Hao Shiyuan’s essays are collected at
Minzubao.com, http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/folder/292573-1.htm.
10
Info. Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic Of China, China’s Ethnic
Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups, C HINESE
G OVERNMENT ’ S
O FFICIAL
W EB
P ORTAL ,
(Sep.
27,
2009),
http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-09/27/content_1427989.htm.
11
Bhavna Singh, Ethnicity, Separatism and Terrorism in Xinjiang: China’s Triple
Conundrum, I NSTITUTE OF P EACE AND C ONFLICT S TUDIES , (Aug, 2010),
http://www.ipcs.org/special-report/china/ethnicity-separatism-and-terrorism-in-xinjiangchinas-triple-conundrum-96.html. See also Xiao Jie, India Still Maintaining Double
Standard
Toward
Exile
Tibetans,
G LOBAL
T IMES ,
(Aug.
5,
2012),
http://www.tibetsun.com/elsewhere/2012/08/05/india-still-maintaining-double-standardtoward-exiled-tibetans.
12
Chang Xuemei (常雪梅), Dui Dangqian Minzu Lingyu Wendi De Jidian Sikao [a Few
Thoughts on Current Problems in the Field of Ethnicity], XUEXI SHIBAO, (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64102/17122242.html. See also J AMES L EIBOLD ,
E THNIC P OLICY IN C HINA : IS R EFORM I NEVITABLE ? 41-43 (2013) Most sociological
studies of ethnicity and education in China see schools as already emphasizing “national
unity and patriotism.” Some scholars decry “assimilative schooling” and “favor what they
call a multicultural approach.” Hua-Yu Sebastian Cherng et al., Sociological Perspectives
on Ethnicity and Education in China: Views from Chinese and English Literatures (Apr.
17, 2013), U NIVERSITY OF P ENNSYLVANIA , http://repository.upenn.edu/elmm/4.
13
Liu Ling(刘玲), Jianchi Jiben Zhengzhi Zhidu Zai Fazhanzhon Gjiejue Minzu Wenti
[Insist on Fundamental Framework Resolve Ethnic Problems], (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://iea.cass.cn/content-BA0810-2012031609383390681.htm.
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have also concluded that “[i]f the state fails to continue to promote
ethnic identity and guarantee affirmative action and some degree of
autonomy, then being Chinese could lose its attraction and the
fragile balance between the state and the minorities would
collapse.”14 Debate continues in China and, unusual for such a
political matter, has appeared in publications targeting foreigners.15
The putative success of U.S. and Indian policies is key to
arguments for depoliticization. Ma Rong argues China should learn
from U.S. cultural integration policies, which have made minorities
into “sub-cultural” groups that view the United States as their nation.
These groups communicate well with each other, as shown by
substantial intermarriage and other mutual assimilations. Rong also
contends that the U.S. government neither sees disadvantage among
minorities as a political issue nor acts to separately protect them;
instead, the state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
provide welfare. The state encourages recognition of ethnic cultural
differences (cultural pluralism), but treats all groups as politically
equal. Despite insistence on assimilation and the primacy of
English and Christianity, a consensus allows ethnic groups to
preserve their cultures and avoid discrimination. Ethnicity is not
specified on U.S. identity cards and is not required on job
applications or for the census. The government seeks reduced
residential and school segregation. Political homogeneity coexists
with cultural diversity and ethnic issues are treated only as
individual or social matters. The United States thus has great
national cohesiveness and identity, with separatist tendencies found
only among the most disadvantaged minorities. 16 India, for Ma
Rong, also has a culturalist, depoliticized approach to ethnicity. The
state promotes Indian nationalism and 90% of citizens are proud to

14

Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He, Seperate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in
China 29-35, 38-39, 43-44 (2010)
15
See, e.g., Wang Wenwen, Han in Xinjiang Victims of Favorable Minority Policies,
GLOBAL
TIMES,
(Mar.
18,
2012),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/700800/Han-in-Xinjiang-victims-offavorable-minority-policies.aspx.; Turgunjun Tursun, Whining From Majority About
Affirmative
Action
Misplaced,
G LOBAL
T IMES ,
(Mar.
18,
2012),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/700799/Whining-from-majority-aboutaffirmative-action-misplaced.aspx.
16
Ma Rong, Meiguo Ruhe Chuli Minzu Wenti [How America Deals With Ethnic
Problems], NANFANG ZHOUMO ( 南 方 周 末 )[S OUTHERN W EEKEND ], (July 16, 2009),
available at http://www.infzm.com/content/31554.
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be Indian. Movements and wars by India’s minority tribes are not
internationalized and minorities do not threaten national unity.17
Depoliticization aligns with classic (conservative) liberalism
through a common dislike of group rights. 18 Classic liberalism
decries multiculturalism that “supports politicization of group
identities, where the basis of the common identity is claimed to be
cultural.” It upholds John Stuart Mill’s ideal of a liberal democratic
social contract founded on individual rights.19
Chinese classic liberals also endorse individual rights, rather
than group rights.20 The view of proponents of a “second generation
of ethnic policies” can be equated with “liberal pluralism,” which
“forbid[s] area exclusivism,” emphasizes “assimilation and
acculturation,” and opposes a “corporate pluralism” that “tolerates
area exclusivism” and “legitimates preferential treatment of
different groups to equalize the distribution of resources.” 21
Depoliticization’s alignment with classic liberalism is particularized
by praise for Indian and U.S. ethnic policies.22

17

Ma Rong, A New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the 21st Century:
Depoliticization of Ethnicity in China, 8 A SIAN E THNICITY 199, 215-216, no. 3 (2007).
18
Junning Liu, Classic Liberalism Catches on in China, 11 J OURNAL OF D EMOCRACY ,
no.3, 48 (2000). “[T]he demand . . . for recognition for segmental and differentiated
collective right [is] something that violates the liberal notion of equality between sovereign
and unencumbered individuals.” See also Ephraim Nimni, National Autonomy in
E NCYCLOPEDIA OF N ATIONALISM 212, 213 (A THENA L EOSSI ed., 2001)
19
Brian Barry, C ULTURE AND E QUALITY : AN E GALITARIAN C RITIQUE OF
M ULTICULTURALISM (2001) (Mill’s view of “minority rights” was that Basques and
Bretons would remain half-savage relics who revolved in their own little mental orbit
unless they became members of the French nation; so too for Welsh and Scots vis-à-vis the
British nation.). See J.S. Mill, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 314 (New York Prometheus
1991) (1861).
See also John Stuart Mill, U TILITARIANISM : O N L IBERTY AND
C ONSIDERATIONS ON R EPRESENTATIVE G OVERNMENT 360-65 (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd,
1861) (Mill also wrote that “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up
of different nationalities . . . Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they speak
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative
government cannot exist.).
20
See Feng Chongyi, Chinese Liberal Intellectuals' Attitudes Toward the Welfare Mix,
Chinese Studies Association of Australia Conference, Sydney (2009); Jane Leung Larson,
Charter 08’s Qing Dynasty Precursor, T HE A SIA -P ACIFIC J OURNAL : J APAN F OCUS , (Jan.
15, 2006), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jane_Leung-Larson/3558.
21
Jacqueline Simpson, Pluralism: the Evolution of a Nebulous Concept, 38 A MERICAN
B EHAVIORAL S CIENTIST 459, 464 (1995).
22
Non-classic liberals do not necessarily oppose collective rights for minorities. A leading
Canadian liberal political philosopher has urged states to “adopt various group-specific
rights of policies which are intended to recognize and accommodate distinctive identities
and needs of ethno-cultural groups. W ILL K YMLICKA , P OLITICS IN THE V ERNACULAR :
N ATIONALISM , M ULTI-C ULTURALISM AND C ITIZENSHIP 42 (2001).
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The comparative evidence of the results of U.S. and Indian
official approaches to ethnicity, set out below, shows, however, that
minorities in the two big liberal democracies remain in subordinate
and deteriorating positions and do not necessarily have higher levels
of national identity or lower levels of political disaffection than
China’s minorities. Because the depoliticization movement’s
proposed diminution of minority rights in China will alter the
intersection of ethnicity, governance, and human rights in ways
detrimental to minorities, it will likely increase, not assuage,
instability, especially in Tibetan and Uygur areas.
The choice for ethnic policies in China, moreover, is not a
binary of individual rights only or no change. The expansion, rather
than contraction or status quo, of minority rights should also be
considered. One possibility is to create structures, such as ethnicbased associations that minorities could use to deal with matters
material to their ethnicity, such as their histories and cultural
elements (self-identity, language, and religion, etc.).
Such
associations would also address their members’ positions within
China’s political and social systems, including issues of inequality.
These structures need not be counter-posed to the state or serve as
mere vehicles for elites, but could instead focus on pervasive
problems.
Self-representation may lead to more minority
participation in China’s governance. The integration, rather than
assimilation, of minorities may mitigate separatism while raising the
level of human rights by allowing minorities to pinpoint ways to
diminish the social and economic gaps between themselves and
Han.23
We first consider the putative model derived from India –
a country often compared with China, but only exceptionally seen as
a model for it – where ethnic minorities have the same proportion of
the population as in China. Next, we take up the supposed model of
the United States, a much less populous, but more developed and
more multi-ethnic, state, whose eschewing of collective rights
Chinese liberals admire. Reviewing comparative results, the claims
of Indian and U.S. success made by proponents of a “second
generation of ethnic policies” are shown to be empirically
23

See generally Barry Sautman, Self Representation and Ethnic Minority Rights in China,
15 ASIAN ETHNICITY (forthcoming 2014) (Explicating the concept of self-representation)
[Note: Asian Ethnicity is a quarterly publication having 4 issues in one year. The first issue
is already out. Request to check with author to find which quarter will his publication be
slotted to come out] (please refer R. 17.3).
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inaccurate, as the relative positions of minorities in those countries
are often worse than in China. For United States minorities, much
of the gap is attributable to discrimination, and for Indian ethnic
minorities, it is in large part due to plundering; for China’s
minorities, though, the gap is mainly a function of location.
Surveys also indicate that Indian and U.S. minorities have no
greater level of national identity than Chinese minorities and in
some respects actually have lower levels.
Despite the deficiencies of China’s ethnic policies, a move
to a U.S. or Indian model would exemplify the Chinese idiom bing
ji luan tou yi – to throw oneself randomly at any doctor in a medical
crisis. When that happens, the cure is often worse than the disease.

AN INDIAN MODEL?
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said his
government has “respect for multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multireligious rights,”24 while proposals to depoliticize ethnicity in China
claim success for India’s ethnic policies. Ma Rong argues that there
are no threatening separatist activities in India; insofar as separatism
exists, it receives little global attention, and India is nationally
united.25 Hao Shiyuan counters, however, that India cannot be a
model because it is not a unified nation or state: deep animosities
exist among ethnic groups, castes and even provinces, and society
lacks a cohesive force. Denying that India’s ethnic policies are
depoliticized, he contends that efforts to deal with recurrent and
newly-generated ethnic and caste conflict have been highly political
and have failed because of strong resentment in Indian society based
on extreme Hindu and “regional” nationalism, the lack of shared
national consciousness, and intense and persistent ethnic and caste
discrimination.26

24

Varghese K. George, China’s Aggression Baffling: Manmohan, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov.
24,
2009,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-s-aggression-bafflingmanmohan/article1-479568.aspx.
25
Ma Rong, Yinyong wenxian buneng duan zang qu yi: Lianheguo kaifa jihuashu dui
yindu ‘Minzu jiangou’ de pingjia (Citations should not be biased: the report of UNDP on
Indian “nation building”), 3 Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao (zhixue shehui kexue ban
[zskb] 33, 52-54 (2006).
26
Hao Shiyuan, Yindu goujian guojia minzu de ‘jingyan’ bu zhide Zhongguo xuexi (India’s
“Experience” of Constructing National Ethnic Groups is not Worth Study by China),
Minzu wenti yanjiu no. 2 67-79 (2013).
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Conditions of the Adivasi
India’s ethnic minorities, officially termed adivasi (original
people) or “Scheduled Tribes” (STs), number some 103 million and
are about the same 8.6% of the population as minorities are in
China.27 Most live not in remote frontier areas but in the heart of
India. About 90% of STs, compared to 69% of India’s total
population, lived in rural areas in 2005.28 They have far higher
illiteracy, unemployment and landlessness rates than Indians
generally.29 STs “are more likely to be ill, less likely to be educated,
more likely to cultivate land and more likely to live in a climate of
fear and oppression.”30 Deprivation of STs includes:
Poor physical access to services; increasing
alienation of STs from their traditional lands; low
voice and participation in political spaces; and poor
implementation of public assistance-poverty
reduction programs, which affects the STs
disproportionately because they dominate the ranks
of the poor and the disadvantaged.31
Adivasi, in fact, are significantly worse off than India’s famous
dalits or “untouchables.”32
Some 46% of rural and 36 % of urban adivasi lived below
India’s very low poverty line in 2000, compared to 27% of rural
27

STs Form 25% of Population, says Census 2011 Data, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, May 1,
2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/scs-sts-form-25--of-population-says-census2011-data/1109988.
28
Maitreyi, Bordia, Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA:
THE SCHEDULED TRIBES 210-11 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012).
29
C.R. Bijoy, The Adivasi of India: a History of Discrimination, Conflict and Resistance,
PUCL Bulletin, February 2003, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Dalit-tribal/2003/adivasi.htm;
Tribes Living in Stigma and Starvation, AHRC NEWS, June 4, 2009,
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-129-2009/.
30
Raghav Ghaia et al., Has Anything Changed? Deprivation, Disparity and Discrimination
in Rural India 15(2) BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 113-123 at 122 (2008); Sumeet
Jain, Tightening India’s ‘Golden Straightjacket’: How Pulling the Straps of India’s Scheme
Reflects Prudent Economic Policy, 8 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 567, 592
(2009); Anand Teltumbde, Inequality and Affirmative Action, Episode 20: Pursuing
Equality in the Land of Hierarchy: Positive Discrimination Policies in India, SOCIAL
SCIENCE BAHA, (Nov. 10, 2013), http://soscbaha.org/about-conf/panelssessions/radioprogramme/459-episode-20.html.
31
Maitreyi, Bordia, Das, et al. supra note 28, 8.
32
Ramachandra Guha, Unacknowledged Victims, OUTLOOK INDIA (April 13, 2010),
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265069.
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Indians and 23% of Indians generally.33 The economic situation has
worsened for STs since privatization of the Indian economy began
in the early 1990s: “In 1993, 25% of those belonging to a [ST] fell
into the poorest wealth decile. By 2005, this figure had risen to
30%. Further, whereas 52% of the ST population fell into the
poorest three deciles in 1993, this figure had risen to 64% by
2005.”34
The Asian Center for the Progress of Peoples (ACPP)
reports that:
40.1 percent of the Adivasis are displaced;5 5.2
percent of the Adivasis are under the below poverty
line; 63.5 percent of the Adivasi households do not
have electricity; 53.1 percent of the Adivasi
households do not have drinking water source; 83
percent of the Adivasi households do not have access
to toilet facility; 56 percent of the Adivasi children
are undernourished; 53 percent of the Adivasis are
illiterate; 76 percent of the Adivasis do not have
permanent houses; and 93 percent of the Adivasis do
not possess land.35
A survey of nutrition in Adivasi households in two states with
relatively high concentrations of these ethnic minorities found that
Out of a total 1000 sample Adivasi households from
40 sample villages in Rajasthan and Jharkhand
surveyed for this study, a staggering 99% were
facing chronic hunger . . . 25.2% of surveyed
Adivasi households had faced semi-starvation
during the previous week of the survey. This
survey found that 24.1% of the surveyed Adivasi
households had lived in semi-starvation condition
throughout the previous month of the survey. Over
99% of the Adivasi households had lived with one
or another level of endemic hunger and food
33

Caste and Community Profile: People Below Poverty Line in India, WIKIMEDIA
COMMONS.
(Mar.
17,
2007),
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Caste_and_Community_of_Profile_People_below_povertyline_in_India.PNG.
34
Maitreyi, et al., supra note 28. See also David Ludden, Empire Meets Globalisation, 47
ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY 213, 221 (2012).
35
Hotline Asia – Backgrounder on Situation of Adivasis in India, ACPP (Oct. 2009),
www.acpp.org/uappeals/bground/Adivasis%20in%20SIndia.htm.
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insecurity during the whole previous year.
Moreover, out of 500 sample Adivasi households
surveyed in Rajasthan, not a single one had secured
two square meals for the whole previous year.36
Moreover, “whether [it is] child mortality, malnutrition,
immunization, contraception, pregnancy or maternal care – STs
continue to exhibit worse outcomes vis-à-vis the national average
and in comparison to non-STs.”37 In 2004-2005, 53% of STs had no
education, compared to a third of non-STs.38 Prime Minister Singh
has admitted that “[t]here has been systemic failure in giving tribals
a stake in modern economic processes.”39 Reasons adumbrated for
the “poor outcomes for STs. . . include (but are not limited to) poor
physical access to services, widespread removal from their
36

Political Economy of Hunger in Adivasi Areas, CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD
SECURITY
(New
Delhi)
(2005),
www.cefsindia.org/reports/Research%20Study%20on%20the%20Political%20Economy%20of%20
Hunger%20in%20Adivasi%20(Tribal)%20Areas%20of%20India.pdf.
There are also
underfed persons in China. A 2011 Gallup survey of 4,000 Chinese reported that 6%
agreed “there have been times in the past 12 months when they did not have enough money
to buy food that they or their family needed”; 19% of Americans polled in 2011 also
agreed with that statement. Rajesh Srinivasan and Bryant Ott, Chinese Struggling Less
than Americans to Afford Basics, GALLUP WORLD, Oct. 12, 2011,
www.gallup.com/poll/150068/chinese-struggling-less-americans-afford-basics.aspx.
37
Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED
TRIBES 210-11 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012).
38
Maitreyi, Bordia, Das supra note 28, 231. The ST under-five mortality in 2007 was 96
per 1,000, but 74 for non-STs. Surveys have shown that among STs living in 10 Indian
states, 52% of children aged 1-5 were underweight, compared to 42% nationally. The
percentage of underweight Indian children is higher than in sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and
much higher than in China (4%), although the percent of underweight children in China’s
western provinces is twice as high as in its eastern provinces. See also id, 224-25;
Malavika Vyawahare, Malnutrition Ravages India’s Children, N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 28, 2013,
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/malnutrition-ravages-indiaschildren/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; JACQUE DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, AN
UNCERTAIN GLORY: INDIA AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS [Need Page Numbers] (2013); Pranab
Bardhan, AWAKENING GIANTS, FEET OF CLAY: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA
AND INDIA [Need page numbers] (2010): Claire Malamed, Putting Inequality in the Post2015 Picture,
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 3, 7 (Mar.
2012),
www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7599.pdf.
India’s ST infant mortality rate of 62 per 1,000 is much higher than in Tibet (20.7). [not
sure what to do with mortality rate info] Jonathan Kennedy and Lawrence King,
Understanding the Conviction of Binayak Sen: Neocolonialism, Political Violence and the
Political Economy of Health in the Central Indian Tribal Belt, 72 SOCIAL SCIENCE &
MEDICINE 1640 (2011); Sixty Years since the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, STATE COUNCIL
INFORMATION
OFFICE
(China),
1,
25
(2011),
http://no.chinaembassy.org/eng/zyxw/t841187.htm.
39
India Plans Offensive Against Rebels, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 2009.
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traditional lands and forests, poor enforcement of legislation meant
to protect their interest, lack of collective voice, and poor
implementation of government programs aimed to assist
them . . . .”40 For example, from 1951 to 1990, 40% of the 21.3
million Indians displaced from their land by state acquisition were
STs.41
A team of scholars from India, Sweden and China who
compared the relationship between poverty and minority status in
India and China have concluded that
Most of China’s poor belong to the Han majority,
while most of India’s poor are Muslims or belong to
the Scheduled Castes/Tribes. Although our study
found that the average minority-majority income gap
in China and India were similar in magnitude, the
results from our multivariate analysis indicated that
much of the minority-majority divide in China was
due to the fact that China’s majority population was
located in its less developed western region. In India
there was evidence of the unfavorable treatment of
minority group persons living in the same location as
persons from the majority group.42
B. Kashmir, the Northeast, Religious Minorities
India’s policies for ethnic and religious minorities have been
largely unsuccessful in Kashmir and much of the country’s
Northeast (Nagaland, Assam, etc.). Additionally, these policies
have not been successful as applied to the 15% of the Indian
population that is Muslim. The situation is similarly poor even as to
some non-minority language and regional groups.
In Kashmir, where two-thirds of the population is Muslim, a
two decade-long counter-insurgency against pro-independence
forces deployed 500,000 Indian troops, cost 70,000 lives and
entailed huge economic and social costs to the state, which now has
severely under-endowed infrastructure and state services compared
40

Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED
TRIBES 210-1 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012).
41
Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED
TRIBES 236-7 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012).
42
Vani Borooah et al., China and India: Income Inequality and Poverty North and South of
the Himalayas, 17 JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS 797, 817 (2006).
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to the rest of India.4344 The vast majority of the dead have been
Muslims, with thousands of them civilians murdered by the army
and police and dumped into mass graves found as fighting finally
dwindled in 2011.45 There was also a pogrom in Kashmir46 in which
Muslims murdered 260 Hindus47 and caused the largest mass exodus
since the 1947 partition of the sub-continent, 48 with 100,000150,000 Hindus fleeing the Kashmir valley.49
Human rights groups say extra-judicial killings and rapes of
Muslims50 by impunity-bearing Indian security forces51 have been
endemic.52 A 2012 report by a Kashmiri human rights lawyer said
“not only is torture endemic, it is systemic. In one cluster of 50
villages, more than 2,000 extreme cases of torture were
documented.”53 One study found “ample evidence that Muslims in
[Jammu & Kashmir] are poorer than Hindus and Sikhs on the basis
of all indicators considered.”54 The Kashmir issue is regionalized:
neighboring countries control parts of what India regards as its state
of Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan controls “Azad [Free] Kashmir,”
while China regards the uninhabited Aksai Chin as its territory. The
Kashmir issue is also internationalized, as the world’s media,
especially in Muslim lands, give it significant attention. Kashmir
has globally been a much better-known issue than Xinjiang, except
for a short time after the 2009 riot in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi.55
43

Debidatta Mahapatra & Shailender Shekhawat, Kashmir Conflict: Causes, Costs and
Prospects of Peace.
44
Seena Shekhawat & Debidda Mahapatra, AFRO-ASIAN CONFLICTS: CHANGING CONTOURS,
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 151-160 (Delhi: New Century Publication, 2008).
45
Id.
46
Amrit Dhillon, Few Kashmiri Pandits Tempted by Generous Offers to Return Home,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sep. 21, 2009.
47
Kashmir, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 25, 2012, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/kashmir/index.htm
48
Robert Wirsing, KASHMIR: IN THE SHADOW OF WAR (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2004)
(showing how fighting abated in 2011, but police violence against protestors continued).
49
Curbs, Strike Shut Valley Down, KASHMIR OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 2013.
50
Izhar Wani, Violence in Kashmir Dips to Record Low: Police, AFP, Aug. 31, 2009.
51
Lydia Polgreen, Two Killings Stoke Kashmiri Rage at Indian Force, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009 (showing that “In Kashmir, separatist tendencies were least when
democracy and autonomy were strongest.”)
52
Deepa M. Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia 116 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
53
Cathy Scott-Clark, The Mass Graves of Kashmir, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 9, 2012.
54
Ajit Bhalla, et al., Social Discontent and Minorities in China and India, CENTER FOR
RESEARCH AND DEBATES IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY, Discussion Paper 73, July 2011.
55
Id. at 26 (finding that “In Xinjiang, both poverty incidence and income inequality are
greater among the Han majority than among Muslim minority (Uygur). Poverty and
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It has been noted that “there are increasingly violent
insurgent movements in tribal areas. A recent [2008] Planning
Commission report links these movements squarely to
underdevelopment and marginalization of STs.”56 Multiple ethnicbased insurgencies exist around India, 57 but especially in the
Northeast where more than 16 million adivasi live, with some
insurgencies ongoing for as long as six decades and costing tens of
thousands of lives:58
[T]he centralized power of the Indian state is
repeatedly questioned in the Northeast of that
country, where several ethnic groups live in eight
states. Also questioned is its management of the
problems of dissent and political identity and
especially the question of ‘one nation,’ with an
emphasis on homogeneity.59
The Extrajudicial Victim Families Association, Manipur has
presented courts a list of 1,528 victims of extrajudicial police
killings in that Northeast state from 2007-2012. 60 The conflict
involving two million Nagas in the Northeast dates to India’s
independence in 1947, when Naga leaders sought a separate state.
The conflict has since been internationalized, involving at various
times the United States, Burma, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan.61
Many Naga leaders reject that Nagas are Indian.62 A 2004 survey in
Nagaland found that 57% of respondents identified as “only Naga,”
inequality indicators are lower for Xinjiang than for J&K. Rural-urban disparities in per
capita consumption are minimal in Xinjiang compared to the rest of Chin”).
56
Das, supra note 28.
57
See generally India: The Land of the Largest Number of Separatist Movements in the
World, SINLUNG (Aug. 16, 2012) http://www.sinlung.com/2012/08/india-land-of-largestnumber-of.html.
58
Northeast India Clashes, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2008, www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/IN_
CLA.htm?v=in_detail (showing that Naga insurgency leaders have claimed 200,000 Nagas
have been killed); see also Luke Harding, Naga Rebels Declare End of War with India,
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2003.
59
Charles Chasie & Sanjoy Hazarika, The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga
Insurgency, EAST-WEST CENTER POLICY STUDIES 52, 2009, at viii.
60
Hari Kumar, Supreme Court to Investigate Police Killings in Manipur, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012.
61
Dinesh Kotwal, The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future, 24 STRATEGIC
ANALYSIS (IDSA) (2000); see also Sanjay Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the
Politics of Northeast India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005) (discussing the
Northeast’s insurgencies).
62
See, e.g., Kaka D. Iralu, Naga Issue: Internal Indian Ethnic Conflict or a Conflict
between Two Nations? IMPHAL FREE PRESS (India), Jan. 30, 2012.
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9% as “only Indian” and 34% as “Indian and Naga.” 63 An
anthropologist who has done fieldwork among Nagas has noted
For the Naga, "Indians" are people from nonNortheastern part of India, who also compose of the
people of India; "India" is the country where "Indian"
people live. For the Naga, they are not ethnically
"Indians" and they are not "Indian" either, although
they are technically Indian nationals.64
Northeasterners may reject Indian identity in part because of racism
directed against them. Many “mainland” Indians call East Asianappearing Northeasterners by the British anti-Chinese epithet
“Chinki” and often do not regard them as Indians.65 Violent conflict
in the Northeast is now only intermittent, but that is because Indian
federal authorities have been put into place and tolerate autocratic
“local regimes of corruption and repression.”66
In India, the term “minorities” is used not for ethnic groups,
which are STs, but for non-Hindu religious groups, such as Sikhs
and Muslims.
India repelled Sikh separatists seeking an
independent Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s. A massive pogrom
against Sikhs followed the retaliatory assassination of PM Indira
Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984, causing 7,000 deaths.67
That was followed widespread killings by security forces that
peaked in the early 1990s, racking up a total of perhaps 20,000
deaths.68 Punjab is still said to be “perhaps [India’s] most separatist
[area] outside of the internationally disputed territory of Kashmir.”69

63

Alfred Stephan et al., Crafting State-Nations: Indian and Other Multinational
Democracies 108, fn. 35 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) (discussing how
even in neighboring Mizoram, where a post-insurgency high degree of autonomy has been
in place since 1986, 32% of respondents to a 2003 survey identified as “only Mizo”).
64
Satoshi Ota, Ethnic Identity and Consumption of Popular Culture among Young Naga
People, India, 7:3 IJAPS :65, 53-75 (2011).
65
Northeast Students Make Merry after Mary Kom’s Olympic Feat, DAILY NEWS &
ANALYSIS, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/sport/report-northeaststudents-make-merry-after-mary-koms-olympic-feat-1726173.
66
See Bethany Lacina, The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India, 46:4 ASIAN
SURVEY 998-1020 (2009).
67
Lily, RS Admits Calling Attention Notice, RIGHT VISION NEWS, Nov. 26, 2009.
68
Dhami, supra note 2.
69
Henry Hale, A Political Economy of Secessionism in Federal Systems, May 2002,
www.core.ucl.acbe/PolIntDes/papers/Hale.pdf.
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In 2002, more than 2,700 Muslims were brutally murdered
in a pogrom in the far western state of Gujarat.70 The state’s leader
then and now has been Narenda Modi, who failed to act against and
even justified the pogrom. He was thereafter shunned for a while by
European Union states, but that ban was lifted in 2012 by the
“mother of democracies,” Britain, in order to promote the interests
of BP, British Gas and other firms “with substantial interests in
Gujarat.”71 In 2013, Modi became leader for the 2014 national
electoral campaign of India’s main opposition party, the “Hindu
nationalist” Bharatiya Janata Party.72 Expectedly, jihadi groups such
as the Indian Mujahideen, inspired by Gulf-based organizations,
emerged in India in the 2000s and have killed hundreds of people,
mainly through bombings.73
There have also been smaller-scale pogroms against Indian
Christians, language and region-based persecution among Hindus,
and caste discrimination which, while not ethnic, is analogous and
severe.74
Adivasis and Maoist Insurgency
Indian Maoists are mainly based among mainland Indian
adivasis. Links between Maoists and Kashmir and Northeast
separatists have also been reported.75 Said to number 100,000 in
armed militia, Maoists operate in 22 of India’s 28 states. They killed
900 police in 2005-2009.76 By 2007, 6,000 people had died in the
70

Francis Elliott, Anger at UK Talks with Leader Who Stood By During Riots, THE TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2012.
71
Id.
72
Lakshmi Rama, India’s Nationalist Opposition Names Controversial Hindu Leader to
Lead Campaign, WASHINGTON POST, June 9, 2013.
73
Profile: Indian Mujahideen, BBC, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-23876150; Jethro Mullen & Neha Sharma, Indian Arrests Yasin Bahtktal, Indian
Mujahideen
Terrorism
Suspect,
CNN,
Aug.
29,
2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/asia/india-terrorist-arrest/.
74
Arundhati Roy, Listening To Grasshoppers: Field Notes On Democracy 3-8, 150-151,
184-185 (Hamish Hamilton 2009)
75
Antony: No Army Troops To Fight Maoists, UPI, Nov. 2, 2009; B. Vijah Murty, If
Taliban Attacks India, We’ll Fight Them, Say Maoists, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/467031.aspx?s=p;
Official:
India’s
Maoist Rebels Expand Influence, AP, Sept. 15, 2009
76
Thomas Marks, Return of the Beast: Maoist Insurgency Lives, 15 J. OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 at 3; Jim Yardley, Rebels Widen Deadly
Reach Across India, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/asia/01maoist.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
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insurgency, including 1,300 insurgents and 2,900 civilians, mostly
STs. Maoists killed 1,700 police and police-supported militiamen in
the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh, a state where the Indian
government is particularly active in assisting land grabs by “some of
the most powerful industrial empires in India: Jindal Power & Steel
and Tata Steel” 77 and where “sovereignty is contested over large
parts of terrain.”78
An Indian anthropologist has specified “the driving forces
for the current civil war as including sharpening inequality,
strengthened rent seeking among business people and politicians in
two states with high ST concentrations, a liberalized national
mining policy, and a growing emphasis on industrialization which
displaces adivasi and other rural people.”79 The 180 districts in 10
states where Maoists now “hold sway” are 40% of the country’s
territory, four times that of 2001.80 Most Maoist cadres are adivasi
or dalit and most of their strongholds are in ST areas,81 but the
mobilization focus varies: in Chhattisgarh and West Bengal it is
tribal rights; in Orissa and Jharkhand it is mostly mining firm
infringement; in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana it is caste and
land; and in Punjab, water.82
India’s Home Ministry has said Maoists “espouse local
demands” based on “prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of
perceived neglect and injustice among underprivileged and remote
segments of the population.” 83 An anti-terrorism specialist has
Cabinet Nod for anti-Naxal Force, INDIAN EXPRESS, Aug. 28, 2008,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/cabinet-nod-for-antinaxal-force/354300/
77
Senior
Maoist
‘arrested’
in
India,
BBC,
Dec.
19,
2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7151552.stm; Megha Bahree, The Forever War:
Inside India’s Maoist Conflict, 27 WORLD POL’Y J. 83, 83-89; On this epicenter of the
Maoist insurgency, see Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: an Anthropological
History of Bastar 1854-2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007); Jason Motlagh, The Maoists
in the Forests: Tracking India’s Separatist Rebels, VIRGINIA Q. REV., Jul. 2008, at 102-129.
78
Nandini Sundar, Insurgency, Counter-insurgency and Democracy in Central India, in
MORE THAN MAOISM: POLITICS, POLICIES AND INSURGENCIES IN SOUTH ASIA 149-168
(Robin Jeffrey et al. eds., 2012).
79
Sundar, supra note 68 at 151.
80
Army not to be Used Against Naxals, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mumbai/army-not-to-be-used-against-naxalspm/article1-464026.aspx; Sundar, supra note 68 at 150. See also Amulya Ganguli, Battle
against Maoists Being Undermined by Intellectuals, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17,
2009 (Maoists in 231 of India’s 626 districts).
81
Id.
82
Sudeep Chakravarti, RED SUN: TRAVELS IN NAXALITE COUNTRY (Penguin/Viking, 2008).
83
Ministry of Home Affairs, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNION MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS,
at 15-6 (Government of India, 2009).
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stated that general public sympathy for Maoists “is relatively
strong . . . because inequalities and injustices of society are blatantly
obvious and the Maoists have been very effective at tapping into
resentments of controversial government actions like the acquisition
of tribal land for mining projects.”84 An historian who writes about
adivasi and is anti-Maoist nevertheless observed that “the Maoists
are prepared to walk miles to hold a village meeting, and listen
sympathetically to tribal grievances . . . . That the Maoists live
among, and in the same state of penury as the tribals, is
unquestionable. That some of their actions have sometimes helped
the adivasis can also be conceded.”85
In a 2010 survey in 36 districts of seven states affected by
the Maoist insurgency, 10% of respondents said they were Maoist
sympathizers, while an additional 37% expressed “mild
sympathy.” 86
The survey takers concluded that “Adivasis
sympathize as much as the rest.”87 In Andhra Pradesh, a major state
in which it was thought the Maoists had been wiped out through
repression, a 2010 Times of India (TOI) poll found that 58% of a
random sample agree that “Naxalism” [Maoism] had been good for
their area.88 Prime Minister Singh terms the Maoists “the biggest
homegrown threat to India's internal security” and admits that the
campaign against them is failing.89 Indeed, in the view of many
adivasi, the biggest threat to the STs has been the Indian state and
the civilian militias it employs to wage war on them.
Adivasi do, however, have “special privileges” under the
Constitution’s Schedules V (areas where the majority of the
population are STs) and VI (northeast India) and
Several well-known state-sponsored commissions
have recommended greater voice for STs in their
own development, and underscore the importance
of land and forest in this process. Of late, the state
84

Jason Overdorf, India’s Hidden War Heats Up, GLOBALPOST, Sept. 24, 2009,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/india/090921/indias-hidden-war-heats.
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Aug.
2010,
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58% in AP say Naxalism is Good, Finds TOI Poll, TOI, Sept. 28, 2010 (This support
was expressed though such polls were carried out in places where security forces have
“penalized anything that could be construed as support for the Maoists.”); Sundar, supra
note 68 at 161.
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2009.
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has legislated to acknowledge the ‘rights’ of ST
areas by taking them further toward self-rule . . .
[T]here are earmarked development funds from
both the central government and the states that flow
to tribal areas through a special budgetary
instrument called the ‘tribal sub-plan’ (TSP). STs
also have quotas in public employment, with 7.5%
seats in all government and quasi-government jobs
(which form the major part of all regular salaried
jobs) reserved for them. They have similar quotas
in public educational institutions and . . . reserved
seats in local governments [but] enforcement of
these far-reaching laws and policies has been weak
for a variety of reasons . . . .90
Adivasis are thus by no means “depoliticized” and it is strikingly
inaccurate to imply that they have no rights beyond the individual
rights proclaimed by the Indian constitution for all citizens. The
STs’ collective rights or preferential policies are inscribed in law,
but their effect is mainly seen in urban areas. STs’ incomes there
match those of the “forward classes” (general castes),91 yet only a
tenth of STs are urban. Chinese proponents of a second generation
of ethnic policies in effect seek to centralize rights by
individualizing them and making them uniform throughout the
country. Studies indicate, however, that when Indian leaders have
opted for re-centralization, they were more likely to fail to
accommodate ethnic and territorial cleavages and thus increase
disaffection among ethnic groups.92
India’s security issues involving minorities are at least as
serious as those in Tibet and Xinjiang, calling into question claims
that India has greater national unity than China.93 Surveys support
90

Das, supra note 28, at 208-9.
Das, supra note 28, at 221-2.
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Atul Kohli, India: Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Nationalism, in
FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES 281-300 (Ugo Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds.
2004).
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Exiles assert Tibetans and Uygurs do not at all identify with China. The Dalai Lama has
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that view as well. In a 2009, 33-country poll, measuring “trust,
admiration, respect and pride in [the participants’] country,” Indians
and Chinese came out virtually the same, with the sixth and seventh
highest rates of admiration for their countries.94 In a 2005 survey on
“pride in India” in which the all-India total of “very proud” and
“proud” was 89%, the result for STs was lower, 77%. That has
been explained to be “partly because these groups fail[] to
understand the question (itself a reflection of the uneven
dissemination of the idea of nationalism in modern India) and partly
because they are genuinely less enthusiastic about Indian
nationalism.”95 Indeed, a large 2010 survey found that 18% of a
random sample of Indians “did not even know the name of their
country.”96 The figure equally applied to illiterates, many of whom
are STs. A sixth of those polled identified only by their ethnicity,
state (i.e. province) or religion and not as Indians.97
Subjective attitudes toward national unity in China and India
thus may be rather similar, but overall, disaffection among ethnic
minorities in India seems higher than in China. Chinese generally
are moreover much more satisfied with the direction their country is
going (83%) than are Indians (38%), according to a 2012 Pew
survey. If that continues, there may be a greater chance of longlived national coherence in China than in India.98

THE UNITED STATES AS EXEMPLARY?
Pervasive Racialization
Opponents of depoliticization have strongly interrogated
claims that the United States has largely unproblematic ethnic
policies and strenuously argue that the United States cannot be a
proper model for Chinese policy. This argument is premised on the
claim that, unlike China, the United States has a society that needs
Harish Chandola, Communist Party Controls Tibet, Times of India (TOI), INDIA TIMES, Jul.
30,
2004,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-07-31/rest-ofworld/27146459_1_renminbi-tibetan-communist-party.
94
National Pride, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2009.
95
Alfred Stepan et al., Crafting State-Nations 69 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)
96
Id.
97
Sanjay Kumar & Yogendra Yadav, Indians not Chauvinist, Hate Hegemony, CNN-IBNHindustan
Times
State
of
the
Nation
survey,
2011,
http://ibnlive.in.com/features/rday/stgateofthenation/natioal.php.
98
Muneeza Naqvi, Survey: Indians Disappointed with Economy, Gov’t, Associated Press,
Sept. 11, 2012. The figure for the U.S. was 29%. Id.

2014]

U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES

111

to consolidate disparate immigrant groups, and tha political elites
have done so by claiming perpetual threats to a vaunted and
universalized political system and way of life. It has also been
argued, contrary to what proponents of depoliticization assert, that
the United States does have explicit ethnic policies, such as
affirmative action.99
In fact, the United States has few ethnic policies, even in
terms of multiculturalism and even compared to less multi-ethnic
liberal democracies. Scholars at Canada’s Queens University who
measured the presence of multiculturalist policies applied to
national minorities in 21 liberal democracies have shown that in
2010 the United States was behind or far behind all countries
surveyed except France and Japan, the two states among those
surveyed that, in effect, refuse to officially recognize the existence
of their national minorities.100
With U.S. political elites generally unconcerned with the
promotion of multiculturalism, let alone ethnic equality, everything
consequential in the United States remains racialized. Take, for
example, opinions about the major U.S. issue of health care. A
2009-2010 survey showed that racial attitudes had a much larger
impact on such views than was shown by polls taken before
President Obama became associated with the policy.101 The racial
divide in health care views was 20% greater in 2009 than for similar
policies that President Clinton had proposed in 1993-1994.102 Thus,
it is reasonable to conclude that some of the opposition to
“Obamacare” stems from racist viewpoints toward President Obama.
Issues ranging from Obama’s nomination of a Supreme
Court Justice to the likeability of his dog have been similarly
racialized,103 but racialization of views on health care stands out, as
99

Hao Shiyuan, Meiguo minzu zhengce bu shi Zhongguo de bangyang [The U.S.’s ethnic
policies are not a model for China], HUANQIU RIBAO, July 13, 2012,
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-07/2910028.html.
100
Multiculturalism Policy Index, www.queeenu.ca./mcpi/; last accessed Oct. 29, 2012.
101
Id.
102
Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama
Polarized Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, 56 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 690, 691 (2012)
103
Sasha Issenberg, It All Comes Down to Race, SLATE, June 1, 2012,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/06/racicalization_micha
el_tesler_s_theory_that_all_political_positions_come_down_to_racial_bias_.html. Ethnic
polarization was also seen in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. White people were 71%,
black people 12%, Latinos 11% and others 6% of eligible voters. William Frey, Why
Minorities will Decide the 2012 U.S. Election, BROOKINGS, May, 2012,
www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/01-race-elections-frey.
Some 40% of
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the health problems of most minorities are far worse than those of
white people. For example, black people are seven times more
likely than white people to be HIV infected, with African American
women 23 times more likely than white women, mainly because the
rate of the HIV infection is seven times higher in prison than outside
and the incarceration rate of black people is almost seven times that
of white people (see below).104 Similarly, a 2012 study of cardiac
arrests found that in low-income black neighborhoods, the odds of
bystander-initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is 50%
lower than in high-income non-black neighborhoods.105 Regardless
of the character of the neighborhood where cardiac arrest takes
place, black people and Latinos are 30% less likely than white
people to receive CPR from a bystander and many die as a result.106
Poverty, Incarceration, and Discrimination
The only U.S. practices aimed at ameliorating
white/minority gaps -- affirmative action (preferential policies) and
a putatively inclusive political process -- have in recent decades
mainly not been ameliorative. Disparities remain huge and the
position of African Americans has generally worsened. In 2009,
7.1% of white people and 12.7% of black people were unemployed;
in 2012, the figures were 7.4% and 14.1%.107 Due to the long
history of enforced marginality of black labor, direct discrimination
has been joined by a relative lack of job networks, which has
ensured a high rate of African American unemployment.108 That
applies after higher education as well: joblessness for African
American college graduates is nearly twice as high as for their white
white people, but 80% of minorities (93% of black people; 70% of Latinos and Asian
Americans) voted for Barack Obama. Minorities Came Out in Droves for Obama, CNN,
Nov. 8, 2012, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1211/08/sitroom.02.html; Face
of U.S. Changing, AP, Nov. 12, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/face-us-changingelections-look-different-0.
104
Sadhbh Walshe, Incarceration: When HIV Infection does Discriminate, GUARDIAN,
June 21, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/21/incarceration-hivinfection- discrimination/print.
105
Comilla Sasson, et al., Association of Neighborhood Characteristics with Bystanderinitiated CPR, 367 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 1607, 1613 (2012).
106
Id.
107
First Black President Can’t Help Blacks Stem Wealth Drop, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 6,
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-09-05/first-black-president-can-t-helpblacks-stem-wealth-drop.html.
108
Deidre Royster, Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks Exclude Black Men
from Blue-Collar Jobs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

2014]

U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES

113

counterparts.109 There is evidence from the U.S.’s gigantic retail
sector that both the racial/ethnic preferences of non-black managers
and lesser job networks continue to diminish hiring opportunities for
black people.110
The official African American poverty rate was 22.5% in
2000; in 2012, 28% of African Americans and 37% of black
children were poor, compared with 25.3% of Latinos and 34.1% of
Latino children, and 10% of white people and 13% of white
children.111 Black household income was 63% that of white people
in 1999, but only 55% in 2011.112 From 2009 to 2012, African
American household income fell over 11.1%, twice the percentage
fall in white income.113
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world,730 people behind bars per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010,
compared to 114 in neighboring Canada and 170 (imprisoned or
detained) in China as of 2009.114 The 2.3 million U.S. incarcerated
exceed the total incarcerated in the 35 largest European states.115
The number of United States incarcerations is up 350% since 1970,
109

Your Wallet, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1N1127C198FB4F0A0A8.html.
110
Laura Giulano, et al., Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27 J. LAB. ECON., 589,
626 (2009). In stores outside the South, changing from a black to a white manager
typically leads to a proportional decline of 15% in black employment in the store, while the
effect in the South is much greater. Change from a white to a black manager increases by
15% the rate at which white people quit.
111
Algernon Austin, Three Lessons about Black Poverty, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
Sept. 18, 2009, www.epi.org/publication/the_lessons_of_black_poverty/; Frederick C.
Harris, The Price of a Black President, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/opinion/sunday/the-price-of-a-blackpresident.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print; Tami Luhby, Median Income
Falls,
So
Does
Poverty,
CNN,
Sept.
12,
2012,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/12/news/economy/median-income-poverty; Information on
Poverty and Income Statistics, APSE Issue Brief, Sept. 12, 2012,
aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/12/povertyandincomeest/ib.shtml.
112
Robert Ross, Poverty More than a Matter of Black and White, INEQUALITY.ORG, Oct. 8,
2012, http://inequality.org/poverty-matter-black-white/.
113
Patrik Jonsson, Will Black Voters Give Obama What he Needs in Southern Swing
Votes?,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR,
Oct.
5,
2012,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/President/2012/1005/Will-black-voters-giveObama-what-he-needs-in-Southern-swing-states.
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International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex, UK, World Prison Brief,
2012,
www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=northam&category=wb_popto
tal. The U.S. has about 20 million felons, with 1.5 million of them currently in prison.
Candidates Ignore Captive Audience, South China Morning Post (SCMP), Oct. 26, 2012.
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Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html?pagewanted=print.
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although the U.S. population has grown only 33% in that same
timespan.116 Incarceration doubled in 1995-2010 alone, although the
number of violent crimes has scarcely increased after 1980 and
property crime has fallen sharply.117
Some 62% of persons incarcerated in the United States are
either Black (44%) or Latino (18%), while these groups make up
just 13% and 15% of U.S. adults, respectively. Three-fourths of
those behind bars for drug offenses are persons of color.118 In 2007,
among U.S. adults, 9.2% of black people, 3.7% of Latinos, and
2.2% of white people were in the corrections system (prison, jail,
probation and supervision).119 Some 11% of black males aged 2534 were incarcerated as of June, 2006.120 Among male adults, 16%
of black people, 8% of Latinos and 3% of white people had served
prison time at some point in their life.121 Black men are more likely
to go to prison than graduate with a four-year college degree or
complete military service. 122 Young black males without high
school diplomas are more likely to be in prison than working.123
Among young men without high school diplomas born in 19751979, 68% of black people, but 28% of white people, had been
imprisoned at some point by 2009 and 37% of black people, but
12% of white people, were incarcerated that year.124 A black boy
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Nake Kamrany and Ryan Boyd, U.S. Incarceration Rate is a National Disgrace,
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Poverty Gap for Blacks and Latinos, 44:29 APPLIED ECON. 3793-3804 (2011).
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al. eds., 2010).
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born in 2001 is projected to have a 1 in 3 chance of going to prison;
a Latino boy a 1 in 6 chance; and a White boy a 1 in 17 chance.125
In part, racial differences in offending, and therefore in
incarceration, are directly tied to social status disparities and black
inner-city residence. A U.S. criminologist has observed:
[S]tatus and residential differences, and the crimes
they foster, are the legacy of historic, deliberate
racial bias, combined with a willful blindness that
allows the modern products of that bias to continue
and in some ways grow worse. In particular, city,
county, and metro-level policies regarding schools,
housing, transportation, and other public services
and subsidies have often worsened, and rarely tried
to ameliorate, criminogenic concentrations of race
and poverty . . . . The criminal justice system’s
response to crime in poor, nonwhite areas magnifies
and perpetuates differences in socioeconomic status
and criminal behavior.126
Direct discrimination in arrests and sentencing play a large
role in racial disparities in incarceration. Ernest Drucker, a
specialist on the effects of mass incarceration has noted that “there
is no evidence that drug use is dramatically different by race or
ethnicity, but the pattern of arrests is very different,” 127 African
American arrestees for drug and property crimes, which account for
60% of all imprisonments, are jailed at three and two times the rates
for white arrestees. Disparities also stem from mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements and laws that force judges to especially
apply higher sentences to crimes more likely to be committed by
black people, such as possession of crack (solid) cocaine, as
opposed to powdered cocaine white people are more likely to use.128
As to sentencing, studies have found that:
125
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46 (Rebecca M. Blank et al., 2004); Pamela E. Oliver, Racial Disparities in Imprisonment:
Some Basic Information, 21:3 FOCUS 28, 28-31 (2001).
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•

Young, black and Latino males (especially if unemployed) are
subject to particularly harsh sentencing compared to other
offender populations;

•

Black and Latino defendants are disadvantaged compared to
white people with regard to legal-process related factors such as
the “trial penalty,” sentence reductions for substantial assistance,
criminal history, pretrial detention, and type of attorney;

•

Black defendants convicted of harming white victims suffer
harsher penalties than black people who commit crimes against
other black people or white defendants who harm white people;

•

Black and Latino defendants tend to be sentenced more severely
than comparably situated white defendants for less serious
crimes, especially drug and property crimes.

Studies that examine death-penalty cases have generally found that:
•

In the vast majority of cases, if the murder victim is white, the
defendant is more likely to receive a death sentence;

•

In a few jurisdictions, notably the federal system, minority
defendants (especially black people) are more likely to receive a
death sentence.129

The 1930s incarceration rate of U.S. black people was 3:1130; in
2010 it was 6.7 times that of white people; 131 Disproportionate
imprisonment is found in many multi-ethnic liberal democracies:
Table 1: Ethnic Majority/Minority Incarceration Rate Ratios
Jurisdiction
Comparison
Ratio
UK132
Black/white
5:1
133
Canada
Aboriginal/white; black/white 7.8:1; 3:1
129

Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing Project, Racial Disparity in Sentencing: A Review of the
Literature 2 (Marc Mauer ed., 2005).
130
Harris, supra note 111.
131
Paul Guerino et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Prisoners in 2010, 7 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.
132
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, 2007/8: A
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE PUBLICATION UNDER SECTION 95 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1991
171 (U.K.) (2009) (estimating that the black/white ratio of stop and searches is 8:1).
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Australia134
S. Africa135
Taiwan136
New Zealand137
Greece138

Aboriginal/white
Black/white; colored white
Aborigine/Han
Maori/non-Maori
Roma/non-Roma
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13:1
5.7:1; 11:1
6:1
6:1
7:1

In comparison, the late 1990s rate for Tibet Autonomous
Region ethnic Tibetans was 70% that of the all-China incarceration
rate and only one eightieth the African American rate. For Tibetans
in neighboring Qinghai province, the incarceration rate was only a
seventh to an eighth of the all-China rate and a mere one fourhundredth of the African American rate.139
133
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and Crime Not Exactly a Black and White Matter, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 25, 2006, at C5
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135
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CRIMINOLOGY 256, 277 (Adam Graycar & Peter Grabosky eds., 2002).
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www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154427.htm.
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CAMPS IN CHINA 168 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that the low incarceration rate for Tibetans
for ordinary crimes may partly result from a policy for minorities of “two restraints [in
arrests and executions] and one leniency [in treatment]” (liang shao yi kuan)). See Zhang
Qimin, Dui shaoshu minzu zhong de fanzui fenzi bixu shixing ‘liang shao yi kuan’ zhengce
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criminal elements). QINGHAI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO SHEHUI KEXUE BAN 1, 1991,
available at http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-183351-1-1.html; Zhang Qimin, Liang shao yi kuan
shi zenme hui shi? (How did two restraints and one leniency come to be?), Jun. 30, 2009,
http://hi.baidu.com/daidangwei/blog/item/dc2295d7445.cb02607088bb3.html (noting that
“in legal and civil disputes, authorities throughout the nation tend to side with ethnic
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The past few decades of large increases in imprisonment of
young African American men may mean that many claims of black
progress are misleading because statistics on employment and high
school graduation are based on household surveys that do not
include people behind bars. For example, a 2012 study showed that,
“including inmates in assessments of high school completion
indicates no improvement in the black-white gap in high school
graduation rates among men since the early 1990s.”140
When identically-qualified U.S. black and white “testers”
were used to study housing discrimination, black people who
expressed interest in a loan, home viewing, or realtor services were
discriminated against half the time as renters and 59% as buyers.141
The U.S. government has implemented programs that foster
residential segregation and fail to adequately respond to housing
discrimination.142 Residential segregation of African Americans has
declined only slightly in the past two decades; most black people are
still severely segregated from white people and in many large
metropolises, the dissimilarity index (no segregation = 0; complete
segregation = 1) exceeds 0.7. Latino and Asian American
residential segregation from other “races” has increased or at least
remained at the level of 30 years earlier, while the U.S. now has
intense Latino and Asian American ethnic enclaves in many parts of
the country.143 As a result in part of segregation, two-thirds of
African-American children born between 1985 and 2000 are being
raised in high poverty neighborhoods, as against 6% of white
children.144
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U.S. schools are more segregated now than in earlier
decades, in part because in 1970, four-fifths of white students were
in public schools, but in 2012, less than half were.145 Some 80% of
Latino and 74% of African American students were in schools
where most students are not white; while 43% of Latinos and 38%
of black people attend "intensely segregated schools," where white
people are 10% or less.146 Most black students are now in schools
where almost two-thirds of students are low-income, nearly double
the level in schools of most white or Asian American students.147
Re-segregation of U.S. schools partly results from government
policy:
The Obama Administration, like the Bush
Administration, has taken no significant action to
increase school integration or to help stabilize
diverse schools as racial change occurs in urban and
suburban housing markets and schools. Small
positive steps in civil rights enforcement have been
undermined by the Obama Administration’s strong
pressure on states to expand charter [publiclyfunded, but privately-operating] schools, the most
segregated sector of schools for black students.148
Black and Latino student performance has also declined to
the level at the beginning of the 1980s, with high school seniors (17
years old) performing at the level of 13-year old white people. The
gap is widening in math and other subjects. The main reasons are a
growing inequality in the resources provided schools and
“unconscious bias.” 149 A 2012 report showed that 52% of black
males, 58% of Latino males, but 78% of white males graduate high
school. That represents a very small narrowing of the gap between
white people and black people (26%) from what it was ten years
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/17/economic-mobility-africanamericans_n_1676811.html,
145
Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus…Separation:
Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 15
(September 2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integrationand-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribusseparation-deepening-double-segregation-for-morestudents.
146
Id. at 7.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 9.
149
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23, 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/23/black-latino-students-per_n_1224790.html.
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earlier (29%), but only, as mentioned above, if incarcerated black
people are ignored in calculating graduation rates. In states where
black populations are small (Idaho, Maine, Utah, Vermont), black
males do about as well or better than white males, because there
they are not relegated to under-resourced education. International
experience (Canada’s Ontario province, Finland, Singapore, etc.)
shows that when developed countries want to rapidly raise high
school graduation rates, they can, but the U.S. government has
chosen to not do so.150
In the past three decades, the number of black people with
advanced degrees and producing growth in the share of minorities in
bachelor’s degree programs.151 A large gap remains however: 40%
of white people, but only 23% of African Americans and 25% of
Latinos who turned 24 in 2009 had a bachelor’s degree or were
studying for one.152 A 2011 report stated that black people with
bachelor’s degrees on average earn 20% less than white people with
these degrees; black people with professional degrees earn 23% less
in lifetime earnings, while those with master’s degrees earn less
than white people with bachelor’s degrees.153 The New York Times
has said that it is “difficult not to attribute the wage gap to outright
bias.”154
Affirmative action is far from compensating for bias. A
2009 study found that affirmative action barely exists in the U.S.
and notes that 18 of the 50 U.S. states, including highly diverse
California, “have on their books legislative enactments or
constitutional amendments prohibiting race-based admissions,
policies in public education and other government programs.”155
Most higher education institutions have no preferential policies for
minorities and thus calculations show that if all such programs
150

“The Urgency of Now: The Schott 50 State Report on Public Education and Black
Males,” SCHOTT FOUNDATION, 2012, www.schottfoundation.org/publications-reports/.
151
Stephen Carter, Affirmative Distraction, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/opinion/06carter.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Bureau of Labor Statistics, America’s Young Adults at 24, 2012,
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsyth.pdf.
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Anthony Carnevale, Stephen Rose & Ban Cheah, The College Payoff: Education,
Occupation, Lifetime Earnings, THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER ON EDUCATION
AND THE WORKFORCE, 11 (2011), http://cew.georgetown.edu/collegepayoff/.
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Mototko Rich, It’s not Just the Degree, but what you Study, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug.
11, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/its-not-just-the-degree-but-whatyou-study/.
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John Johnson and Robert Green, Affirmative Action (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2009):
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ended, the chances of a white applicant’s admission would only rise
by 1.2%.156 At U.S. law schools, affirmative action expands the pool
of black students by only 14% and only a third of black students
admitted under affirmative action succeed in becoming lawyers.157
In U.S. society generally, white women are affirmative action’s
main beneficiaries.158 Affirmative action in higher education may
be further curtailed after a 2013 Fifth Circuit Court decision that
requires judges to strictly scrutinize “inherently suspect” admissions
programs that have race as a component and permit only those
narrowly tailored to “further compelling government interests.”159
However, this particular decision was later appealed and reversed.
African Americans face discrimination in 20% of job
interviews; employers are 16% more likely to give a job to a white
person even when a black person applied first and was better
qualified, and are four times more likely to ask black applicants
about job absenteeism than to ask white people.160 White people get
50% more call-backs than similarly-qualified African Americans;
white people people’s higher-qualified resumes elicit 30% more
call-backs than lower-qualified ones, but for black people, having
higher qualifications makes no difference in terms of call-backs.161
White people with criminal records actually get more call-backs
than equally-qualified black people who have no criminal record.162
From 1994 to 2004, complaints of racial discrimination filed at the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) rose by
125%.163 A 2012 study of five million private workplaces showed
156
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin et. al. 631 F.3d. 248 (5th. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750
(1978)); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin et. al., 631 F.3d. 218 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (S.Ct. 2003).
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10th ed., 2006).
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that the trend to greater racial equality in U.S. workplaces had
halted by 1980 and that the biggest gainers in managerial positions
have been white men. Employment segregation of U.S. workplaces
is high and, in one-sixth of U.S. industries, mainly those with high
wages, racial segregation of white and black men is in fact
increasing.164
Increasing Ethnic Inequality in Income and Wealth
In recent decades, average black incomes have fallen relative
to white incomes: they were 34% of white incomes in 1880, 47% in
1947, 60% in 1971, 63% in 1974, 58% in 2010, and 55% in 2012.165
Moreover, “the median annual household income for black people
declined by 11.1% (from $36,567 to $32,498) from June 2009 to
June 2012.”166 The decline for white people was 5.2% and for
Latinos 4.1%,167 but over the longer term and in many respects, there
is a decline among Latinos as well. Princeton University sociologist
Douglas Massey, who studies the Latino population, remarked in
2012 that “over the past 20 years they have fallen on almost every
measure of social and economic well-being . . . .”168
Contrary to “American Dream” scenarios, children from
low-income backgrounds have little opportunity to strike it rich;
they have a 1% chance to make it to the top 5% of income earners,
whereas children of the rich have a 22% chance. Black children
born in the bottom quartile of income distribution are nearly twice
as likely to remain there as adults than white children with parents
having identical incomes. Because differences in mobility for
African Americans and white people persist, even after taking into
account many parental background factors and children’s education
and health, race per se remains an important determinant of
economic mobility.169 Black people born into the middle class have
164
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a much higher chance (50%) of downward income mobility than
middle-class-born white people (16%). African Americans born
into poor families (lowest quintile income) have a higher chance
(54%) of staying poor than white people born into a poor family
(31%).170 In 2000, black people reached the 1991 white high school
completion rate and 1977 white college completion rate, but their
incomes averaged only those of white families in 1963. Only a third
of the more than 20% gap in wages between black and white men
can be explained by the sum of factors other than race
discrimination.171
Black people have much less wealth than white people and
their position declined from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s and then
declined further in the mid-to-late 2000s as the recession held sway:
From 2005 to 2009, inflation-adjusted median wealth
fell by 66% among Latino households and 53%
among black households, compared with just 16%
among white households. As a result of these
declines, the typical black household had just $5,677
in wealth (assets minus debts) in 2009; the typical
Latino household had $6,325 in wealth; and the
typical white household had $113,149. Moreover,
about a third of black (35%) and Latino (31%)
households had zero or negative net worth in 2009,
compared with 15% of white households.
Thus in 2009, white wealth was on average 20 times African
American wealth; the white-to-Latino wealth ratio was 15:1. In
1995, the differences in both cases had been seven times. About a
quarter of all Latino (24%) and black (24%) households in 2009 had
no assets other than a vehicle, compared with just 6% of white
households172
170

Julia Issacs, ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT, ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF BLACK AND WHITE
FAMILIES (2007); Kenneth Ng & Nancy Virts, The Black-White Income Gap in 1880, 61:1
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Some 80% of black people start adulthood with no wealth
and no access to it through relatives.173 A 2012 report found that
68% of African Americans reared in middle quintile households fall
into the bottom two quintiles, compared to 31% for white people.174
Compared to white people, black people continue to be bereft of
important assets. Of the 932 million acres of agricultural land in the
U.S. in 1999, 98.1% was owned by white people and only 0.9% by
black people.175 Only 18% of black people and Latino people, but
43% of white people, have retirement savings accounts.176 Much of
African American wealth loss in the recession was because 60% of
black peoples’ wealth was in home ownership. Banks had
disproportionately steered black and Latino people into buying high
interest sub-prime mortgages: members of these minorities with
good credit ratings received sub-primes at three times the rate of
white people with equal credit ratings. The result is that about a
fourth of African American homeowners are likely to have lost their
homes in the crisis.177
U.S. ethnic policies have not created harmonious “race
relations.” Black people in 2010 were 13% of Americans, but 70%
of racial hate crimes victims, while white people, were 72.4% of the
U.S. population, but 17% of victims.178 Almost all minority people
see white people as economic and political competitors; white
people are so advantaged they do not see minorities as
competitors.179
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After uprisings in scores of U.S. cities from 1964-1968, a
safety valve was supposed to have opened through opportunities for
ethnic minorities to join elites; yet, in Miami in 1980 and Los
Angeles in 1992 there were major uprisings, while smaller ones
occurred in many other U.S. cities.180 A systematic study of such
events has concluded that more are likely, albeit in forms different
from the earlier ones.181 Meanwhile, affirmative action has hardly
affected the ethnic profile of the top rungs of firms that dominate
the U.S. economy: in 2005, 98% of CEOs of Fortune 500
companies and 95% of their top earners were white males.182
Contrary to common assumption, the U.S. government does
not have a vigorous program to promote ethnic equality and
President Obama years has been exceptionally quiescent about
ethnic inequality. University of Pennsylvania scholar Daniel Gillion
examined Public Papers of the Presidents and determined that in his
first two years in office, President Obama had spoken less about
race than any Democratic President since 1961. 183 President
Obama’s 2011 State of the Union message was the first such speech
since 1948 to not mention either poverty or the poor.184
If there has been little “Black progress” in the U.S. and
significant evidence of deterioration in the material position of
African-Americans, there has also been an increase in white racial
prejudice against Black people during the tenure of the U.S.’s first
African American president. In a 2012 random sample survey of
Americans conducted for Associated Press (AP) by university
researchers, 51% expressed explicit anti-black attitudes, up from
48% in 2008, while 56% had implicit anti-black attitudes, up from
49% in 2008. In a 2011 AP survey, 52% of non-Latino white
people expressed anti-Latino attitudes and 57% did so implicitly.185
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Indigenous and Colonized U.S. Minorities
The rights of Native Americans (“American Indians”), the
only Americans who have been endowed by law with
comprehensive minority group rights, are now under assault from
those who want to end all government-sponsored ethnic preferences.
Opponents of affirmative action seek to gut the body of “Indian law”
that singles out for special treatment tribal Indians living on or near
reservations. 186 Scaled-back rights would adversely impact this
indigenous minority, whose income level is only two-thirds that of
white people, whose college enrollment rate is only 42% of white
people, who have a 25% poverty rate, a 40% unemployment rate,
and a suicide rate more than twice the national average.187 In the
plains states, where Native Americans are concentrated, they have a
very high incarceration rate compared to the averages in those
states.188
Table 2: Percent Native Americans (NA) in Plains States
Populations and Imprisoned There
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State
South Dakota

% NA Pop.
8.9

NA % Prison Pop.
29

North Dakota

5

19

Nebraska
Wyoming
Montana
Minnesota

1
2
7
1.3

5
7
19 male; 33 female
9
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The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights attributes such disparities to
differential treatment by the criminal justice system, lack of access
to adequate counsel, and racial profiling.189
Native Hawaiians have even worse conditions than Native
Americans. Between first contact with Europeans in 1778 and the
U.S. annexation of 1900, the native Hawaiian population decreased
by about 95%, mainly through the introduction of diseases.190 In the
subsequent century, the native population partially recovered, but
largely due to intermarriage, which spread out the potential to claim
Native Hawaiian status, so that full Native Hawaiians are now less
than 5% of the native population. 191 Native Hawaiians are, by
official reckoning, 20% of the state’s population; but they account
for 75% of Hawaii’s annual deaths among persons less than 18
years of age.192 While in the last three decades, rates of death from
diseases have decreased for the state’s non-indigenous people, they
have increased significantly for Native Hawaiians. 193 The life
expectancy of Native Hawaiians is about 10.5 years less than the
statewide average and around the level of poor Latin American
countries.194
Hawaiian poverty and incarceration rates are twice the
statewide average. The higher the level of education, the lower the
participation of Hawaiians: they are 25% of elementary and
secondary students, but 16% of community college students, 9% of
189
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University of Hawaii main campus students and only one out of
every 200 students awarded MA, PhD, law, and medicine degrees.195
Yet, “the university and the state legislature refuse to fund request
for tuition waivers and other educational aid specifically targeted for
Hawaiians.” 196 Adult Native Hawaiians have an arrest rate that
equals their proportion of the population (20%) and a lower rate still
for violent crimes, but an incarceration rate that is twice the state
average; so that they make up 40% of the state’s inmates.197 Native
Hawaiian juveniles have an arrest rate equal to their proportion in
the population, but are 50% of incarcerated juveniles. State
authorities largely blame Native Hawaiians themselves for these
conditions, ignoring the routine discrimination that they face.198
Indigenous Alaskans (Inuit or “Eskimos” and Natives, e.g.
Athabaskans, Aleuts, etc.) are 16% of the state’s population and
have conditions very like those of Native Hawaiians.199 They earn
on average less than half white Alaskans’ incomes per capita and
have much greater educational failure, health problems, poverty,
language loss, alcoholism and violence than other Alaskans. 200
Their rates for these disabilities are some of the highest in the U.S.
The overall unemployment rates for indigenous Alaskans have been
pegged at 27.3% (men) and 16% (women). The poverty rate for
Alaskan native has been put at 27.5%, versus 9.8% for all Alaskans.
Alaska Natives’ rate of incarceration exceeds 250% of their
numbers in the state’s general population.201 Their suicide rate is
twice that of the state’s non-natives.202
The U.S. government treats one group of U.S. minority
citizens as second-class in law. Puerto Ricans living in their large
island U.S. territory “plainly possess fewer political rights than their
195
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counterparts in the fifty states. They are subject to various forms of
external tutelage (both legislative and judicial) on which they have
weak voice and no vote.”203 Some scholars have thus regarded
Puerto Rico as a colony.204 In contrast, while political rights in
China are constrained, second-class citizenship is not inscribed in
law for any minority area; in fact, China’s minority areas have some
rights beyond those of non-minority areas (see below). Puerto Rico
has a 45% poverty rate, three times the U.S. national average and
83% of Puerto Rican children live in high poverty areas, versus 11%
of U.S. mainland children.205
Mistrust and Separatism
The large and growing disparities between white people and
most U.S. ethnic minorities reflect that there is, in effect, no U.S.
government initiative to specifically better the lot of minorities. The
remains of affirmative action and inclusion of minority politicians
are virtually the limit of U.S. ethnic policies.206 These policies
however are not mainly fruits of the labors of U.S. political elites,
who have mostly resisted them, but products of the 1960s and 1970s
civil rights movement. Since then, it has largely been social
203
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movements and not state policies that have deployed to counteract
deterioration in minorities’ social position. These efforts have
largely been unsuccessful, in part because many Americans despise
politicians,207 but cling to electoral politics as the sine qua non for
redressing inequity.208 Yet, political mistrust is much higher among
African Americans than among white people and has a different
character: white people’ mistrust tends to be based on discontent
with government performance, while black people’s mistrust is
more a function of unhappiness with the political system itself.209
The absence of policies to close the ethnic gaps in every
aspect of U.S. life contributes to disproportionate support for
separatism and a lesser degree of U.S. nationalism among black and
Latino minorities. In a 2008 poll, 22% of Americans supported a
right to secession for their state or region, but 43% of Latinos and
40% of black people did so, while 18% of Americans, but 33% of
African Americans, say they would support a secessionist
movement. The strongest support for a right to secession (40%) and
for secessionist movements (25%) was among 18-24 year olds and
such support was stronger among liberals than conservatives.210 A
2012 poll for Rasmussen Reports found that 24% of Americans
“believe states that should be able to withdraw from the United

207
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Political System, 62 POL. RES. Q. 132 (2009); James P. Wenzel, Acculturation Effects on
Trust in National and Local Government Among Mexican Americans, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1073
(2006) (Latino political mistrust of the U.S. government increases with acculturation.);
Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in
the U.S. Congress 47 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) (Some 60% of African
Americans favor altering electoral rules to guarantee black people and Latinos are
represented in Congress in their proportions of the U.S. population).
210
One in Five Americans Believe States Have the Right to Secede, MIDDLEBURY
INSTITUTE (July 23, 2008), http://middleburyinstitute.org/zogbysecessionpoll2008.html.
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States to form their own country, if they want” and 51% said that
the U.S. federal government presents a “danger to liberty.” 211
After the Texas governor hinted in 2009 that Texas might
secede if Texans found the federal government’s policies not to
their liking, 31% of polled Texans believed Texas has a right to
secede,212 despite a post-Civil War U.S. Supreme Court ruling that
held that no state has that right.213 Some 35% of surveyed Texans
and 48% who identify with the Republican Party agreed Texas
would do better if independent; 61% of all Texans and 48% of
Republicans disagreed.214 After President Obama’s re-election in
2012, a petition endorsing Texas independence garnered 116,000
signatures in one week 215 and 20% of Texans (35% of Texas
Republicans) indicated they would support Texas seceding because
of President Obama’s election victory. 216 Nationally, 18% of
American adults and 25% of Republicans voiced the same
position.217
211

Liz Harrington, American Support for Secession Increases 10% in Just 2 Years,
CNSNEWS.COM (June 6, 2012), www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2892159/posts.
Secessionists in the U.S. have advanced an intellectual basis for their ideas through a book
edited by Emory University political philosopher Donald Livingston, Rethinking the
American Union for the 21st Century (Gretna: Pelican Pub, 2011).
212
Perry’s Hint of Secession May be Aimed at Primary, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
April 19, 2009, at 3B.
213
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869). Justice Antonin Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
most conservative member, wrote in 2006 that, “If there was any constitutional issue
resolved by the Civil War, it is that there is no right to secede.” Abby Rogers, Sorry
Secessionists, Justice Scalia Won’t Help You Out, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2012),
www.businessinsider.com/justice-scalias-views-on-secession-2012-11.
214
Alex Koppelman, Half of Texas Republicans Favor Secession, SALON.COM (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.salon.com/2009/04/23/texas_secession/. In Canada, besides Quebecois,
many westerners are separatists: 36% of Western Canadians (Alberta 42%, Saskatchewan
32%, British Columbia 31% Manitoba 27%) have said they are willing to consider Western
Canada becoming independent. Kevin Steel, A Nation Torn Apart, WESTERN STANDARD
(Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.westernstandard.ca/website/article.php?id=928.
215
Manny Fernandez, With Stickers, a Petition and Even a Middle Name, Secession Fever
Hits
Texas,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/us/politics/with-stickers-a-petition-and-even-amiddle-name-secession-fever-hits-texas.html?_r=0.
216
Clinton Could Win Texas in 2016, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Jan. 31, 2013),
www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_TX_013113.pdf.
217
A Quarter of Republicans Want to Secede, Half Think Election Stolen, PUBLIC POLICY
POLLING (Dec. 4, 2012), www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/12/a-quarter-ofrepublicans-want-to-secede-half-think-election-stolen.html. Support for secession was
higher in certain regions. For example, 42% of Republicans in the U.S. state of Georgia
indicated support for it. Jim Galloway, PPP survey: 42% of Ga. Republicans Would
Secede…, POLITICAL INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2012), http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jimgalloway/2012/12/07/ppp-survey-42-of-ga-republicans-would-secede-nathan-deal-jobapproval-at-37/.
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A 2007 survey question on secession by Vermont drew
support from 13% of respondents. 218 The Alaska Independence
Party has about 15,000 registered voters, while the two major
parties have a combined total of 200,000.219 Secessionist ideas that
have been advanced by some minority organizations since the
1960s220 are not necessarily anathematized by mainstream black and
Latino leaders.221
Greater minority than white support for secession accords
with a lower level of patriotism, a proxy for national identity in the
hyper-nationalistic U.S..222 A 2005 Gallup poll reported that 80% of
white people termed themselves “extremely patriotic” or “very
patriotic,” but only 46% of non-white people did so; conversely,
20% of white people said they are “somewhat patriotic” or “not
especially patriotic,” while 53% of non-white people did so.223 In a
2009 Pew survey, 61% of white people, but 35% of black people
agreed they were “very patriotic.”224
While it seems unlikely U.S. secessionists will gain power,
few expected a secessionist party to take power in part of Britain, as
did the Scottish National Party in 2011, despite Scots and English
218

Michele Schmidt, Awareness and Support for the Arts Thriving in Vermont, 1 CENTER
4 (2007).
219
Malia Litman, Civil War in Alaska, MALIA LITMAN’S BLOG (Jun. 6 2012),
http://malialitman.wordpress.com/2012/06/06/civil-war-in-alaska/.
220
The Nation of Islam (“Black Muslims”) had sought an independent country out of five
U.S. states. Peter Kihss, In Return for Years of Slavery, Four or Five States, The NEW
YORK TIMES, April 23, 1961, at 406. Mecha, the largest Latino student organization,
asserted that the U.S. Southwest is “Occupied Mexico,” an idea still advanced by the
Mexica Movement, La Voz de Aztlan and others. An Absolut Outrage, INVESTORS
BUSINESS DAILY (Apr. 9, 2008), http://news.investors.com/040908-444918-an-absolutoutrage.htm?ntt=absolut; Bridget Johnson, No Place in Debate for Separatist Voice, DAILY
NEWS (LOS ANGELES) (Jun. 12, 2007), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20070612/noplace-in-debate-for-separatist-voice.
221
Alton Maddox, Jr., No Blacks in the U.S. Senate in 2009?, AMSTERDAM NEWS (NEW
YORK) (Dec. 24, 2009), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2011/apr/12/no-blacks-in-the-ussenate-in-2009/.
222
A measure of nationalism, in 35 countries in 2003 and China in 2008, with a scale of 1100, found China had the highest score (80) and the U.S. second highest (76). Tang
Wenfang and Benjamin Darr, Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origin, 21 J.
OF CONTEMP. CHINA, 811, 816 (2012). In studies among U.S. university students in 2002
and 2004, “blacks expressed lower levels of all forms of national attachment,” including
national identity. Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib, American Patriotism, National Identity
and Political Involvement, 51 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 63, 71 (2007).
223
Joseph Carroll, Post 9/11Patriotism Remains Steadfast: Nonwhites Least Likely to Feel
Patriotic, 266-267, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, July 19, 2005.
224
Polls on Patriotism and Military Service, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 2011,
www.aei.org/publicopinion9 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
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being joined in a United Kingdom for over three centuries and
sharing language and religion. Still less was it expected that
Catalonia, a part of Spain for three centuries where in 2006 only
13% of those polled favored independence, would see a two-thirds
pro-independence majority in the local parliament in 2012. 225
Although hugely advantaged economically, developed countries
with substantial national minorities tend to have secessionist
movements, as in Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque country in
Spain, Flanders in Belgium, and Quebec in Canada, movements that
may gain power.226 In short, liberal democracy, in India, the U.S. or
elsewhere, does not guarantee national solidarity.

CHINA

ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN
Disparities and Location

Ethnic inequalities in China may be culture-related,227 but
most mainly derive from socio-economic factors. The gaps often
discussed include employment, income and wealth, with it asked
whether they result from discrimination. There are substantial
income differences:
Table 3: Minorities’ Average Monthly Incomes as % of Han
Incomes in 2005228
Rural
Urban
225

Miles Johnson and Julius Purcell, Catalans Consider Road to Independence, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012); Agence France-Presse, Catalonia Grows in Distance from Spain,
SCMP (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1091391/cataloniagrows-distance-spain.
226
John Coakley, PATHWAYS FROM ETHNIC CONFLICT: INSTITUTIONAL REDESIGN IN DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 2-3 (London: Routledge, 2010).
227
Cai Le, et al., Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pre-Hypertension and
Hypertension in Rural Southwest China, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 420 (2011). (discussing
higher blood pressure and hypertension among some minorities). Juliet Elu and Gregory
Price, Does Ethnicity Matter for Access to Childhood and Adolescent Health Capital:
Evidence from the Wage-Height Relationship in the 2006 China Health and Nutrition
Survey, 4TH WORLD CONGRESS ON REMEDIES TO ETHNIC AND RACIAL INEQUALITIES, UNIV.
OF
MINNESOTA
(Oct.
11-3,
2012),
www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/rwc/conferences/fourth/pdf/GregoryPrice4thWorldCongressPap
er.pdf.
228
Emily Hannum and Wang Meiyan, China: A Case Study in Rapid Poverty Reduction, in
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 165 (Cambridge University Press,
2012).
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Man
101
Hui
83
Zhuang
69
Miao
66
Uygur
61
Other minorities 73

Man
Hui
Zhuang
Miao
Uygur
Other minorities

94
96
72
76
82
85

A 2009 State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia minwei) study
reportedly concluded that “minority farmers and herders now earn
only 72% of the national average, versus 88% in 1980. Urban city
dwellers earn about 84% of the national average, versus 87% in
1980.”229 Other scholars noted that among rural households, the
ratio of minority to Han per capita household income stagnated at
66.3% in 1988, 67.14% in 1995, and 65.73% in 2002. But among
urban households, the ratio increased from 92% in 1988 to over
100% in 2002. For urban dwellers, minority returns to education
were higher than for Han in 1995, but almost identical in 2007,
while the premium for SOE employment was higher for minorities
than for Han. From 1995 and 2007, the gap widened as to males
and narrowed as to females, but almost none of the inter-temporal
changes in earnings disparities can be attributed to difference in
treatment of minorities in one period versus treatment of minorities
in another period or to differences in the treatment of Han in one
period versus treatment of Han in another period. Instead, most of
the changes can be attributed to changes in endowments.
The widened gap for urban males by 2007, despite minority
educational attainment almost equaling that of Han, might be
explained by decreased availability of SOE employment. The
narrowed gaps for urban females likely results from preferential
policies.230
229

Ian Johnson, Beijing’s Ethnic Policy Faces Data Challenge, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Jul. 22, 2009), online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124816735513967749.
The 2008
percentages are not for minorities per se, but the ratios of the five ethnic autonomous areas
(Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi) and three provinces with high
minority concentration (Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai). China Spends 5 Billion USD on
Poverty Relief for Ethnic Minorities over Five Years, XH (Dec. 22, 2010),
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/22/c_13660255.htm.

230

Ding Sai, et al., Inter-Temporal Changes in Ethnic Urban Earnings Disparities in
China, 653-696, Li Shi, et al (eds), RISING INEQUALITY IN CHINA: CHALLENGE TO A
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Differences in treatment are
“measured by the differential returns to education, job opportunities, household structures,
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The origins and dimensions of ethnic disparities in China
may however be determined more by location (regions, urbanity and
topography)231 and minority customs and less by discrimination than
is the case in, for example, in the U.S. There, a prominent study
found that human capital and region accounted for 55% of the
black-white wage gap, occupation distribution accounted for 20%,
and the 25% unaccounted for was at least in part likely to be
attributable to discrimination.232 A scholar of ethnic disparities in
China has remarked that
Geography is important in patterns of ethnic
advantage and disadvantage.
More urbanized
ethnic minority groups and groups not concentrated
in poor regions tend to experience smaller or no
disadvantage compared with the Han population.
More rural ethnic minority groups have less access
to education and social safety nets – unemployment
and pension insurance – than do the more urbanized
Han, Hui, and Manchu. School enrollment gaps are
smaller in urban areas. Health insurance quality is
also tied to location . . . . Overall, Han-minority
disparities across social welfare outcomes diminish
sharply when geographic differences are taken into
account, suggesting that many gaps that appear as
cross-ethnic differences are due to differences in
regional development.233
firm types, or provincial labor markets. The economic interpretation of these differential
returns is that they can produce unequal treatment of otherwise identically situated
workers.” Id. at 660.
231
Hannum and Wang, supra 228 at 163.
232
Eric Grodsky and Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and
Occupational Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542 (2001).
For an overview of more recent studies, see Devah Pager and Hana Shepherd, The
Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit and
Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOL. 181-209 (2008). Studies may substantially
underestimate the effects of racial discrimination in the U.S. because of more recent
findings concerning the over-reporting of earnings by African Americans males in surveys.
Kim Chang Hwan and Christopher Tamobini, Do Survey Data Estimate Earnings
Inequality Correctly? Measurement Errors Among Black and White Male Workers, 90 SOC.
FORCES, 1157 (2012).
233
Emily Hannum, Ethnic Disparities in China: Geography, Rurality and Socioeconomic
Welfare, WORLD BANK, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES COUNTRY BRIEF NUMBER 3, 2011-2,
siteresources.worldbank.org/.../Resources/.../China-brief-0928.pdf. See also Emily C.
Hannum & Meiyan Wang, Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status and Social Welfare in China
23 (Asia-Pacific Education, Language Minorities and Migration (ELMM) Network
Working Paper Series 2010), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/elmm/2.
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China’s ethnic minorities are highly concentrated regionally:
Table 4: % Ethnic Minorities and Autonomous Counties by Region:
234

Population
Western 71.6
Central 16
Eastern 12.4

Counties
Western 91.6
Central 5.1
Eastern 3.2

In the large-scale 2002 Chinese Household Income Project survey,
in which 11% of the sample was ethnic minorities, 85% of
“disadvantaged minorities” were found in the western region, while
Han were even spread throughout the country.235
China’s ethnic minorities are disproportionately rural: a few,
such as Man and Hui, are at least as urban as Han, but in 2005, 45%
of Han, but only 20% of Uygurs, 17% of Miao, 29% of Zhuang, and
23% of other minorities were urban.236 In Xinjiang in 2000, Han
were 54% urban, minorities were 24% and Uygurs 19%.237 A study
found that in China in 2011, urban earned incomes were 5.2 times
higher and urban disposable incomes 3.3 times higher than rural
earned and disposable incomes. The urban/rural wealth divide grew
26% from 1997 to 2011 and 68% from 1985 to 2011.238 Also,
“minorities are more likely to live in more isolated, remote villages
with difficult topography and poor infrastructure”: a 2002 survey
found that 38-44% of minority villages were in mountainous
areas.239 China’s minorities are highly concentrated geographically.
As of 2005,
[T]he degree of ethnic clustering (density) is still
remarkable. In all, 73% of Mongols in China find
234

Cherng et al., supra note 12, at 3.
CARLOS GRADIN, RURAL POVERTY AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA, 3, 8, 9 (2013),
www.ecineq.org/ecineq_bari13/FILESxBari13/CR2/p156.pdf.
236
Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 165.
237
Cao Huhua, Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization: What is the Role of
Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Groups? A Case Study of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region in Western China, 44:8 REGIONAL STUDIES, 965, 977 (2010).
238
China Daily, Urban/Rural Income Gap Gets Bigger: Report, XINHUA (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/14/c_131785215.html.
239
Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 166.
235
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their home in Inner Mongolia, and over 70% of
Tibetans in China reside in Tibet and [a]
neighboring prefecture in western Sichuan province.
About 99% of Uyghurs populate Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region and 92% of the Zhuang
population lives in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region.240
In contrast, such geographical distinctions scarcely apply to
U.S. minorities. They are significantly less regionally concentrated
than Chinese minorities:
Table 5: % of African
Regions, 2010241
African American
South
55
West
10
Midwest
18
Northeast
17

American and Latino Populations in U.S.
Latino
South
West
Midwest
Northeast

36
41
9
14

Regions of concentration for black people (the South) and
Latinos (the West), are also much less behind the rest of the U.S.
than China’s west is behind the rest of China.242 A 2012 study has
found that in the U.S., the “differences in personal income are
actually quite small between regions. If we account for . . .
education and age, the differences shrink further. We also find little

240

Jia Wenshan, Ethno-Political Conflicts in China: Toward Building Interethnic Harmony,
in HANDBOOK OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 177, 184 (Dan Landis & Rosita Albert eds., 2012).
241
U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 CENSUS SHOWS BLACK POPULATION HAS HIGHEST
CONCENTRATION
IN
THE
SOUTH
(Sept.
29,
2011),
http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn185.html. See also, Sharon R.
Ennis et al., U.S. Census Bureau, THE LATINO POPULATION: 2010, in 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 4
(May 2011).
242
See Anthony P. Carnevale & Nicole Smith, A Decade Behind: Breaking Out of the LowSkill Trap in the Southern Economy (Georgetown Public Policy Institute ed. 2012),
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/DecadeBehind.Executive
Summary.073112.pdf; See also Marc Parry, The Neighborhood Effect, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-NeighborhoodEffect/135492/ (stating that Black people and Latinos are disproportionately concentrated
in poor neighborhoods, but location is not determinative of lower earnings or education
because this factor has not changed where residents of such neighborhoods were given
vouchers to move to low poverty neighborhoods).
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evidence that gaps have increased over the past decade.”243 There is
also a “low range of variation of poverty across regions in the
United States” and “the effect of the higher concentration of Black
people in the poorest states was statistically insignificant” in
determining the poverty gap between black people and white
people.244 The same was true of the geographical concentrations of
Latinos, so that “The state or region where minorities live play no
role in explaining their higher poverty rates.”245
Greater minority rurality in China is moreover the opposite
of the U.S., where minorities were 37% of the population in 2012,
but only 21% of the rural population in 2010. 246 Moreover
“minorities are more likely to live in the largest metropolitan areas
(more than 2.5 million inhabitants) than in non-metropolitan areas,
which actually had the highest poverty rates.”247 The U.S. rural
population is located differently from in China: most is in exurbias,
just outside urban areas. Just 1.3% of U.S. farmers in 2007 were
black and 2.5% were Latinos; only 45% of these minority farmers
had farming as primary occupation.248 Among Chinese minorities in
2005, 54% of Hui, 61% of Man, 76% of Zhuang, 82% of Miao and
Uygurs and 79% of other minorities reported agriculture as their
occupation.249 In contrast to China, U.S. mountain areas are not
necessarily poor and they generally have few ethnic minorities.250
243

See Nelson Oliver & Steven Whitaker, Regional Differences in Household Incomes,
FEDERAL
RESERVE
BANK
OF
CLEVELAND,
(2012),
www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0512/01regeco.cfm.
244
Gradin, supra note 235, at 3795.
245
Id.
246
Kenneth M. Johnson, Rural Demographic Change in the New Century: Slower Growth,
Increased Diversity, CARSEY INSTITUTE (No. 44 5, 2012).
247
Gradin, supra note 235, at 3795.
248
Black Farmers , NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV. (NASS), U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS
OF AGRIC. (2007), www.texassmallfarmersandrancherscbo.com/.../blackfactsheet.pdf;
Latino Farmers NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV. (NASS), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF
AGRIC. (2007), www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online.../Latino.pdf (stating
that Black, Latino and Native American farmers have sued the U.S. Department of
Agricultural for discrimination in the provision of loans and received significant
settlements). See also Latino Farmers Facing Financial Hardship Offered Lawsuit
Financing
by
RD
Legal
Funding,
LEGALFUNDING
(Apr.
10,
2012),
http://www.legalfunding.com/news/hispanic-farmers-facing-financial-hardship-offeredlawsuit-financing-by-rd-legal-funding/.
249
Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 175.
250
Shelton Johnson, Why Do So Few African Americans Visit National Parks, ALTERNET,
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://alternet.org/environment/why-do-so-few-african-americans-visitnational-parks (describing how an African American Park Ranger in the mountainous
Yosemite National Park has explained that the low visitation rates in U.S. national parks by
black people are because “There are very few African Americans who have a childhood
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Locational differences are central to ethnic disparities in
poverty levels in China.251 As much as 35% of ethnic minority
households are asserted to have incomes below the official poverty
line.252 Yet, a study of rural poverty that “control[ed] for a number
of household and location factors, [showed] no strong signs of
household ethnicity having an independent effect on poverty
status.”253 While 6.2% of minorities, but only 3.3% of Han had
experienced one three-year spell of poverty, the difference
disappeared as to shares of long-term poor among all poor
households (20% for minority households; 23% for Han).254 A
econometric study of rural poverty and ethnicity in China concluded
that
The incidence of poverty is larger among minorities
because they tend to live in the least developed and
mountainous areas that are being more slowly
benefit[ed] from the strong country’s [sic] economic
growth. Poverty is higher among minorities also
because they, especially in the western region,
generally have more children, and less economic
opportunities in a scenario where market forces
increasingly determine incomes given their lower
education and engagement in off-farm activities.255
A study of the urban/rural income gap and urbanization in Xinjiang
found that
wilderness experience, an experience of mountains, deserts, forests, or grasslands.” This
factor contrasts with Chinese minorities).
251
Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 198 (regarding not only to Han/minority
disparities, but also those among and within minority groups).
252
See Xing Le, et al., 2012 CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMISTS, Introduction and Impact of Preferential policies on Minority
groups
in
China
9-10,
10-11
(Aug.
18-24,
2012),
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agsiaae12/126633.htm (discussing how, in late 2011, the
poverty line was raised from Y1,274 to Y2,300 a year per capita, in purchasing power
parity terms at or above the U.S.$1.25 United Nations standard. The new figure per day
increased the number of Chinese in poverty from 27 million to 128m). See also Reality
Check
that
Helps
Nation’s
Poor,
SCMP,
Dec.
10,
2011,
http://www.scmp.com/article/987374/reality-check-helps-nations-poor. It is not clear from
what year the 35% figure derives. The 35% of ethnic minorities figure would amount to
about 40 million people).
253
Bjorn Gustafsson & Ding Sai, Temporary and Persistent Poverty among Ethnic
Minorities and the Majority in Rural China, 55:1 REVIEW OF INCOME AND WEALTH 588,
604 (2009).
254
Id.
255
Gradin, supra note 235, at 14.
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Geographical location plays an important role in
defining the context of minority areas. Minority
communities,
particularly
rural
minority
communities, are usually situated in relatively
cohesive, distinctive and isolated locations . . .
[M]inorities inhabit mainly rural areas located in
remote border regions, particularly in the south of
the province. This disadvantaged location creates a
considerable
obstacle
for
socioeconomic
development.
The study noted that “in 2000, nearly 80% of minority employment
opportunities in Xinjiang were concentrated in the agricultural
sector associated with a low income.” 256 Low-income Uygurs
mainly live and farm in southern Xinjiang; 12% of Uygurs live in
northern Xinjiang. Minorities in the north, such as Kazakhs, earned
much higher incomes “owing to favorable geographical conditions
and to activity primarily in the animal husbandry sector.” Moreover,
“[a]ccess to education is . . . always problematic in
the minority countries of Xinjiang. In general, the
geographical features of the isolated, frontier
regions where minority populations generally live
create insurmountable difficulties with respect to
access to education. Increased distance from
schools increases both the opportunity cost of
acquiring education and gender disparities in the
attendance rate.
In addition to geographical
constraints, many teachers in remote areas do not
have the necessary qualifications and lack
opportunities for in-service training.” 257
Because urban bias in Xinjiang’s development favors locales where
Han are more concentrated, urbanization has not mitigated urbanrural disparities.
Location may also combine with customs in explaining gaps.258
For example, the widened Han/minority rural income gap cited
256

Cao, supra note 237, at 976-7
Cao, supra note 237, at 976-7, 979.
258
The same seems to hold for differences in educational attainment for Han and minority
students. See Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 191 (finding that the same seems to
hold for differences in educational attainment for Han and minority students).
257
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above is a result of privatization and commercialization of China’s
countryside, which created a need for peasants to seek off-farm
employment.259 Out-migration from minority villages may be lower
than from Han villages due to lower education levels and the
“closed” nature of the village socioeconomic setting. 260 Thus,
“ethnic minorities in rural areas are less likely to work outside the
home village and such differences in the propensity for labor
migration can negatively affect the income of minority
households.”261 In Ningxia, Hui farmers go out more than Han
farmers to work and as a result have closed the gap between their
income and poverty levels and those of nearby Han. In contrast,
one of the main reasons contributing to urban Hui females’ 21%
earnings gap with the Han are shorter educations and larger number
of children. There are “no signs of an ethnic disadvantage in
earnings determinations.”262
Discrimination, Preferences and Autonomy
Ethnicity does affect hiring and some part of Han/minority
income gaps. It was found to decrease the probability of minorities
(Hui in Lanzhou, Gansu; Uygurs in Urumqi, Xinjiang) being hired
by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 263 It impinges on the jobmatching process for Hui and Man in Beijing, who were “more
likely to be sorted into jobs with lower bonus awards and are more
likely to be under and unemployed.”264 Survey data for minorities
259
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and Han in eastern China cities in 2004-2006 found little systematic
wage bias between both groups, determining that
“[t]he difference in wage outcomes between the
Han majority and ethnic minorities can be explained
by differences in education and job type. Once these
factors are controlled for, the wage differential
disappears. However, the quantitative data cannot
explain why minorities are sorted into jobs that
provide lower compensation than Hans.”265
Thus, not much of earnings differentials may result from
discrimination. A study found that different socio-economic
statuses (education, employment by SOEs, etc.) and family
responsibilities (many more children, more housework for women,
etc.) explain earnings differentials between Uygurs and Han in
Urumqi,266 rather than discrimination by private employers.267 It may
be the case that it is only for some minorities in some locales that
there is likely to be significant job bias.
To the extent discrimination in minority hiring exists, it may
be more widespread in Han areas than in ethnic, autonomous areas.
Direct evidence of hiring discrimination exists from a resume audit
study in which researchers submitted 10,796 pairs of similar
resumes to internet job boards in six cities for three kinds of jobs.268
The resumes were randomly assigned names indicating applicants
were Han, Mongol, Uygur, or Tibetan. The pairs for Hohhot, Inner
Mongolia were Mongols and Han; for Xinjiang, they were Uygur
and Han. Discrimination was measured by differences in callback
rates. Han/minority callback ratios were Mongolian 1.36, Uygur
1.83, and Tibetan 2.21 to 1.269 In Chengdu and Shenzhen, minority
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callback rates were much lower than Han rates.270 In Kunming, the
callback rate for Mongolians differed little from Han, and in
Nanjing, only the callback rate for Tibetans was significantly lower
than for Han. In Hohhot, callback rates for Mongolians and Han
were very similar and in Urumqi, the callback rate for Uygurs was
higher than for Han. Some 47% of all firms, but 61% of SOEs
called back both Han and minority candidates; 46% (32% of SOEs)
called back only Han and 7% (6.8% of SOEs) called back only
minorities.271 About 61% of firms in minority areas called back Han
and minorities, 16% called back only Han, and 23% called back
only minorities.272 Thus, “[f]irms in minority areas appear to treat
minority candidates equitably,” even though the firms were in cities
with huge Han majorities (Hohhot, 87%; Urumqi, 75%).273
In Urumqi, there is nevertheless a widespread perception of
discrimination, 274 even if evidence of it is mixed and outcomes
largely depend on the category of employer.275
Such studies point to a key difference in hiring
discrimination in China compared to the U.S. In China, 75% of
minority people live in ethnic autonomous areas and in such areas
hiring discrimination appears to be less prevalent than in Han areas.
The U.S., however, has no officially designated minority areas
except reservations, where about one million Native Americans
(less than 1% of the minority population) live.276 Ethnic regional
autonomy in China, but not in the U.S., thus may help mitigate
discrimination.
A study of factors influencing income gaps in seven
provinces where minorities were more than 9% of the population
concluded that the “income disparity between the Han and minority
270
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population is not that large . . . instead, [it is] inequalities within the
Han population and among the minority populations [that]
contribute significantly to the overall Gini coefficient.”277 The main
factor determining income differences in rural areas is that ethnic
minorities generally do not live in the same places as rural Han.
Thus, the smaller the area analyzed, the smaller the Han-minorities
income gap. In some rural areas in Guizhou and Yunnan, minorities
are better off than their Han neighbors.278 Another study concluded
that,
“[i]f there is income gap between ethnic groups
within a larger region, [it] stems mainly from the
geographical distribution of different ethnic groups
in different areas, and not from ethnic factors.
Moreover, long-standing government policies of
giving various preferences to minorities have
created a situation where Hui status not only does
not give rise to discrimination in income but even
confers higher income on these people.”279
Preliminary results of a study of employee recruitment in
Yunnan agriculture in 2005 found that “ethnic minority status has a
significantly positive effect on the probability of employment . . .
even after controlling for gender, education, age and spatial
distribution . . . .”280 Preferential policies may thus affect being
hired to work in agriculture. A statistical study in Gansu and
Guizhou has shown that preferential policies have “played a
remarkably significant role in the promotion of economic growth in
the ethnic minority areas. These policies have helped in effectively
accelerating the economic development of the ethnic minority

277

A.S. Bhalla and Luo Dan, Poverty and Exclusion of Minorities in China and India
(Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 105 (describing how the Gini coefficient
measures the degree of inequality with a population, with zero as completely equal income
distribution and one as a single person having all the income.).
278
Bjorn Gustafsson and Li Shi, The Ethnic Minority-Majority Income Gap in Rural China
during Transition, 51 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 805-822 (2003).
279
Li Shi and Ding Sai, An Empirical Analysis of Income Inequality Between a Minority
and a Majority in Urban China: the Case of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, GLOBAL
COE HI-STAT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 022, Jan. 2009, at 17, http://hermes-ir.lib.hitu.ac.jp/rs/ bitstream/10086/16463/1/gd08-022.pdf .
280
Bente Castro Campos, Ethnic Minorities, Occupational Attainment and Employer
Recruitment
Choices
in
Rural
China,
available
at
www.iamo.de/uploads/media/Project_Castro_Campos_02.pdf.

2014]

U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES

145

areas.”281 Being a minority does not however much impact the
growth of peasant incomes, except in pastoral and semi-pastoral
areas, in part because inequality is created by the increasingly
uneven distribution of land, which is mainly a function of higher
minority birth rates.282
A study of whether ethnic status in rural Guizhou and Hunan
influences the probability of dropping out of school before nine
years of education found no significant disparity between minorities
and Han once community-specific effects are taken into account.283
A study of Han/minority health inequality in nine Chinese provinces
found it was significant and growing in 1989-2006, but that “the
overall minority-Han difference in health and nutrition status is
explained largely by the difference in endowments, particularly the
difference in provincial economic development level.”284 A paper
using panel data from 1989-2006 concluded that Han/minority
inequality in household income is best explained by regional
inequalities.285 Another 1989-2006 panel data study showed that,
after controlling for gender, education, experience, and work unit
type,
the hourly wage of ethnic minorities in urban areas
was 12.8 percent higher than their Han counterparts
in 1989. By 1991, this wage differential has
dissipated – the wage difference between Han and
ethnic minorities was mostly negative, but not
significantly different in the remaining years of the
sample. Similarly, there is no evidence of wage
differentials in rural areas.286
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It is often assumed that Han migrants to minority areas have
higher incomes than host area ethnic minorities, but a study of
service sector employment found Uygur internal migrants to
Urumqi, Xinjiang are better educated, more formally employed, and
often higher-earning than self-initiated, mainly interprovincial Han
migrants to the city.287 A study of income attainment for Han locals,
Han migrants and Uygurs in Xinjiang, based on the 2005 minicensus, found that the overall income disadvantages of Uygurs came
mainly from within-sector difference, not sector segregation. 288
Within the non-agricultural sector, Uygurs were more likely than
Han to be in government and other institutions.289 They earned
about the same as Han locals, reflecting preferential policies.290 In
sectors with less state influence and more marketization, ethnic
inequality exists, as Han locals are more likely to enter SOEs, Han
migrants are more present in private enterprises, and more Uygurs
are self-employed.291 It is posited that Uygur frustration arises from
competition with Han in these sectors.292
Ethnic disparities in China have grown partly for the same
reason as in the US: deepened neoliberalism, i.e. privatization and a
retreat of the state in key areas. The widened gap in China may
however largely result from a general increase in urban/rural
disparities. Overall, it may not be as sharp as in the U.S., where
comparison is feasible, such as with urban incomes.
Ethnic and National Identity of Minorities
China, like most states with national minorities, also has
ethnic secessionists, whose level of national identity is obviously
low. 293 There do seem however to be smaller differences in degrees
of national identity between Han and China’s minorities than exists
between U.S. white people and minorities. In a 2008 Asian
287
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Barometer poll, Chinese responded to the question “Are you proud
to be a Chinese?”294 Using a 1-4 scale (4 very proud, 3 proud, 2 not
quite proud and 1 not proud at all), in eastern China, Han and
minorities both had a 3.3 average; in central China, Han had 3.4 and
minorities 3.2; in western China, Han had 3.2 and minorities 2.8.295
The 2006-2007 Chinese Ethnicity Survey of high school
students asked “How close do you feel to your country?” and “How
close do you feel to your ethnic group?” with choices being “not
close at all,” “not very close,” “close,” and “very close.”296 The
results were coded to convert them into a “feeling thermometer” on
a scale of 0-100 and showed higher ethnic identity among minorities
than Han, but uniformly high national identity:
Table 5: National and Ethnic Identity in China297
Ethnicity Country ID
Ethnic ID
Han
89
80
Hui
90
89
Mongol
90
91
Tibetan
89
91
Kazak
89
95
Uyghur
90
96
Among 1,600 high school students polled as part of the same
survey in seven Xinjiang locations (74% Uygur, Hui, Kazakh and
Mongolian; 26% Han), 78% felt “extremely close” to their ethnic
group, while 74% felt extremely close to China. The two identities
were highly correlated. Asked to choose between Xinjiang, Chinese
or both identities, twice as many Uygur respondents chose Chinese
over Xinjiang identity, while 44% chose both.
The study
determined that the high degree of national identity found among
Xinjiang minority students was partially created by affirmative
action programs.298
294
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Question from a random sample 2008 China Survey, going
to levels of Chinese nationalism, found Han had a high “feeling
thermometer” level of 84, with the levels for Hui (89) and Uygurs
(87) even higher.299 Moreover, “linguistic and religious minorities
such as the Huis, the Manchus, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols show
just as high levels of nationalism as the Han majority.”300 The levels
of nationalism of these ethnic groups all exceeded the very high U.S.
level of nationalism.301 It also found that “[c]ontrary to what one
might expect, Han Chinese are significantly less supportive of the
state than minority groups. This effect is not substantively large,
but it holds true despite controlling for confounding factors such as
family income, religiosity, education, and rural community
type . . . .”302 In contrast, in a 2004 poll in the U.S., 39% of white
people, but only 22% of black people, indicated that they trust the
U.S. federal government most of the time.303 The racialization of
trust in the U.S. government reversed after Obama’s election304 and
the misplaced expectation that Obama would advance the interests
of ethnic minorities, especially African Americans, may explain
why there have not been “riots” despite the continued decline in the
position of black people under his tenure.
A survey among more than three hundred ethnic minority
“no-fee pre-service” students -- i.e. those training at government
expense to become teachers -- at Southwest University (Xinan
daxue) in Chongqing produced findings in accord with those of the
2008 China Survey discussed above.305 These students hailed from
25 ethnic groups (most prominently Miao, Tujia and Uygur) and on
the whole had a strong sense of identity with their ethnic groups,
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even higher than their identity with the Chinese nation.306 The two
identities however were positively correlated; that is, in general the
higher the sense of ethnic identity, the higher the sense of Chinese
national identity.307 Their identification with the Chinese nation’s
society and culture was moreover found to be significantly higher
than their identification with their own ethnic group’s society and
culture, and more advanced undergraduates had less ethnic identity
than younger ones, was explained as resulting from greater contact
with Han students.308
There is substantial ethnic inequality in China and reasons
for it are both the same and different from those in India and the U.S.
Neo-liberalist shrinking of the state’s role vis-à-vis minority
interests, everywhere arrests efforts to achieve ethnic equality.
Indians STs’ rurality plays a continuing role, but accelerated
plundering of adivasi in the last couple decades by government, in
the service of industry and particularly through dispossession, is
also highly relevant. In the U.S., racialization remains pervasive
and many gains made by the mid-20th Century Civil Rights
Movement have been eroded by the shriveling of the few extant
ethnic policies, such as affirmative action, and by a huge increase in
minority imprisonment.
Every inequality in China has been widened by more than
three decades of reform. Expanded private enterprise has
particularly widened the scope for ethnic discrimination in hiring.309
Meanwhile “Chinese anti-discrimination laws have not developed to
tackle the kinds of discriminatory behavior that have appeared with
the establishment of the market economy.” 310 Employment and
services discrimination is not covered by the criminal law or
detailed in civil law.311 There are no “concrete remedies for a victim
of discrimination . . . . This is why there are no cases in minority
regions about employment discrimination despite the fact that the
ethnicity requirement in civil servant examinations and other
discriminatory behavior are main topics of private conversation
among people in these regions.”312
306
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Yet discrimination, while present for some minorities in
some spheres, appears to play a lesser role in ethnic inequalities
than in India and the U.S. The studies discussed above indicate that
one reason for that is countervailing effects of ethnic regional
autonomy and preferential policies. 313 Despite dis-equalization
inherent in the reforms, these policies still play a role, at least as to
the ranks of government and parts of the state-owned economy.
Although India is not at all depoliticized in the sense that
proponents of depoliticization of ethnic minorities in China
conceive it,314 India’s many policies to address collective interests of
its minorities are offset by other policies that allow officials to
divert funds for social services and encourage predatory
corporations to dispossess adivasi. It is the pervasively racialized
U.S. however that epitomizes depoliticization, by seeming to hardly
have ethnic policies.315 Yet, that has not made U.S. minorities adopt
the same attitudes as white people toward the state:
disproportionately, minorities mistrust the state or even reject it.
Within the context of existing political arrangements, minorities are
more dissatisfied with the level of support it provides: 60% of white
people exit-polled in the 2012 elections thought the government
should do less, while 58% of Latinos and 73% of black people
thought it should do more.316 Asked in a 2011 poll how much of a
role government should play in trying to improve the social and
economic position of minority groups, 19% of white people said a
major role, 50% said a minor role, and 30% said no role at all.317
Among African Americans, it was 59%, 32% and 8%.318 Asked
313
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whether new civil rights law are needed to reduce discrimination
against black people, 15% of white people agreed; 83% did not.319
Among black people, 52% said such laws are needed, 48% said they
are not.320 Not surprisingly, “in a 2009 Pew poll, 58[%] of AfricanAmericans and 53[%] of Hispanics said they favor preferential
treatment to improve the position of black people and other
minorities. Only 22[%] of white people agreed.”321
Intermarriage: More Prevalent in the U.S. than China?
If U.S. minorities are not highly supportive of the state, they
also are not necessarily more connected to the majority population
than China’s minorities. Some scholars322 in addition to Ma Rong
have asserted that a prime indication the U.S. has more stable ethnic
relations than China is a higher rate of ethnic intermarriage. Yet,
intermarriage rates are higher in China than in the U.S., when the
U.S.’ much higher minority proportion is taken into account, as
having a larger percentage of minorities creates more intermarriage
opportunities. In fact, China’s interethnic marriage rate was higher
than the U.S.’ in 2000, the base year of the main study of
intermarriage in China. In the U.S. in 2000, 2.6% of families were
ethnically inter-married;323 in China in 2000, 3.23% of Chinese were
in bi-ethnic households. Rates among China’s ethnic groups varied
due to geographical concentration, group size, customs, etc.; for
examples, 1.05% of Uygurs, but 7.71% of Tibetans were
intermarried. The highest rate was near 90%. The average for
China’s 55 minority groups was about 25%.324
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That the availability of other ethnic groups with which to
intermarry is a key determinant of intermarriage, can be seen as to
Tibetans. In 2000, 7.7% of all Tibetans were intermarried, but the
rate for Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where
non-Tibetans were only about 6% of the population, was only 0.7%.
More than half of China’s Tibetans live outside the TAR, in areas
where non-Tibetans are generally a much higher proportion than in
the TAR. Thus, more non-TAR Tibetans are likely to intermarry.
Even in the TAR, the rate of intermarriage appears to have
increased rapidly.
In 1990, there were 2,369 Tibetan/Han
intermarried households. The number increased to 7,343 by 2000
and was geographically more dispersed. 325 Reportedly, by 2008
“[m]ore than 20% of all marriages in Tibet each year were interethnic marriages, and the rate in Lhasa has an annual double-digit
growth.”326
The proportion of the intermarried U.S. couples also
increased significantly in the 2000s, reaching 8% in in 2008 and
8.4% in 2010, with 4% of all married couples in the U.S. then of
“different races” 327 and the rest presumably marriages between
Latinos (not counted as a “race” by the U.S. Census Bureau) and
other groups.
From 1980-2008 however, “different groups
experienced different trends. Rates more than doubled among white
people and nearly tripled among black people. But for both
Hispanics and Asians, rates were nearly identical. . . .”328 Moreover,
“despite the large immigrant influx, there has been little evidence to

Thierry Warin, Chinese Interethnic Marriage: Passion or Rational Choice, 4 INT’L J. OF
ECON. AND BUS. RESEARCH, no. 6, 2012, at 738.
325
Ma Rong, POPULATION AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY TIBET, 263 (Hong Kong
University Press, eds., 2011).
326
Rate of Inter-Ethnic Marriages Rises Annually in Lhasa, ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF
WOMEN (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/womenofchina/report/918351.htm. See also Xu Zhenming, Xiahe xian Labuleng zhen zu ji tonghun zhuangkuang
diaocha (Survey on Interethnic Marriage in Labrang Township, Xiahe County), 6 GANSU
SHEHUI KEXUE 192, 192-195 (2005) (discussing a study finding that the number of HanTibetan marriages almost tripled between 1978 and 2000 in a township in Gansu Province
known for its Tibetan Buddhist monasteries).
327
Emily Alpert, Interracial Couples on Rise in U.S., Census Data Show, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2013.
328
Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Marrying Out, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (PRC), 2010,
ww.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/755-marrying-out.pdf; The Rise of Intermarriage:
Rates, Characteristics Vary by Race and Gender, PRC (Feb. 16, 2012),
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/.

2014]

U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES

153

date of an emerging multi-ethnic American identity or of a new
American “melting pot” stirred by intermarriage.”329
Data on intermarried households in China in 2010 is not yet
available. Hong Kong sociologist Raymond SK Wong, extracting
intermarriage data for the 791,946 married couples in the 2005
mini-census, found that 87,155 (11%) were in bi-ethnic
households.330
Minorities were 8.5% of Chinese in 2010,331 but more than
28% of Americans.332 The U.S. minority proportion was thus 3.3
times that of China. The percentage of China’s intermarried
households likely increased in the 2000s, due to greater interethnic
contact as minorities urbanize, a shortage of Han women because of
China’s skewed sex ratio, and increased utility for Han in marrying
a minority as the urban one-child policy tightened.333 Yet, even if
the proportion of intermarried Chinese was unchanged in the 2000s,
the U.S. proportion of intermarried in 2010 would only be 260%
that of China, while the proportion of minorities in the U.S. is 330%
that of China. Intermarriage is even more pronounced in China than
in the U.S. given China’s high geographical concentration of
minorities, which contrasts with the much more even geographical
spread of U.S. minorities.
China’s minorities are also
disproportionately rural; U.S. minorities are disproportionately
urban, while workplaces and neighborhoods in urban areas tend to
be ethnically much more mixed than in rural areas. In fact, ethnic
329
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intermarriage in China is now common enough that it is several
times more prevalent than interprovincial marriage.334
Many sub-national studies confirm that, mutatis mutandis,
intermarriage in China is at least as common as in the U.S. In
Beijing at the 1990 census, when 3% of people there were
minorities, 2.2% of Han, 16.7% of Hui, 87.3% of Manzu, 90.5% of
Mongolians, and 14.3% of Koreans were intermarried.335 In Inner
Mongolia in 1990, when 15% of inhabitants were Mongols, HanMongol couples were 40% of all marriages.336 In 1994-1995 in
Hohhot, where 13% were minorities, 23% of Han, 78% of Mongols,
99% of Man and 33% of Huis married inter-ethnically. 337 In
comparison, U.S. 1990 census data shows the rate of intermarried
white people as 1.5%, black people 4.1%, Asians 17.7% and “some
other race” (almost all Latinos), 15.7%.338
For Yunnan province, where 33% of people were minorities,
1990 data showed 7.3% of households had Han/minority couples -5% in Han areas and 11% in minority areas.339 For Yunnan’s capital
Kunming in 1990 “intermarriage was prevalent among all
minorities . . . . The highly positive market conditions for
intermarriage were created by the institutions and policies, among
them preferential policies for ethnic minorities and . . . highly
ethnically mixed workplaces and neighborhoods.”340 In 1991-1996,
334
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for the three largest ethnic minority groups in the city, among Yi,
only 15.7% were in-married (75% were married to Han, the
remainder married other minorities); for Bai, only 8.6% were inmarried (81.8% married Han); and for Hui, 27.1% were in-married
(67.2% married Han). Status homogamy moreover was highly
prevalent: “there was no exchange between Han ethnic status and
minority socioeconomic status, which has often been found in the
North American context”; that is, in contrast to findings from the
U.S., Chinese ethnic minorities of higher socioeconomic status do
not marry ethnic majority people of lower economic status, but
rather minority/Han couples tend to have the same socio-economic
statuses.341
A 2002-2003 intermarriage survey was carried out in
Tacheng, Xinjiang, a city of 150,000, with a minority percentage
close to that of the U.S.’s ethnic minority/”mixed race” proportion
of 37% in 2011. Some 15% of new U.S. marriages then were
interracial/interethnic. In Tacheng, 40% of new marriages were biethnic.342 It appears then that where ethnic groups interact in China,
the intermarriage rate is at least as high as in the U.S. The main
exceptions are Ningxia and much of Xinjiang, where there is a fairly
low degree of minority/Han interaction and less-educated Muslims
religiously eschew exogamy.343

CONCLUSION: NO MODELS, NO VIABLE CASE FOR
“DEPOLITICIZATION”
Just as there is no reason to conclude that intermarriage has
diminished the U.S.’ pervasive racial/ethnic divisions, there is no
compelling evidence that the U.S. or India has generally lower
levels of ethnic minority disaffection than China. That is so despite
both countries being less proven targets of external forces seeking to

341
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promote minority disaffection than China.344 While complex arrays
of those and other factors continue to produce conflict involving
parts of China’s Uygur and Tibetan populations, survey results
indicate that “officially designed assimilation policies, such as
improvement of socioeconomic status, Chinese-language learning,
and political recruitment into the Communist Youth League, did
lead to greater acceptance of the Han people among minorities [and]
also led to greater ethnic tolerance of all groups, not only the Han
people.”345
Many changes can be made to China’s ethnic policies that
may reduce ethnic inequality and strengthen national coherence.346
There is however no indication that anything is to be gained by
diminishing existing minority rights in order to apply ineffective
Indian and U.S. models. Given that these models allow for
demonstrably pervasive invidious discrimination or ethnic
plundering, their application in China, would likely result in both
greater inter-ethnic socio-economic disparities and increased
minority mistrust of Han and the state.347 It is quite possible that the
perspicacious proponents of depoliticizing China’s ethnic relations
realize that and chose the U.S., India and Brazil as models, not
because they vindicate their proposals, but rather because they are
large and influential countries and states of the sort that liberals
prefer. Russia, another large, influential semi-authoritarian state,
cannot serve as a model because it retains some features of the preexisting Soviet model of ethnic relations, from which proponents of
depoliticization (erroneously) claim China’s system was copied.348
Other globally significant states either still have small numbers of
344
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minority peoples (e.g. South Korea, Argentina) or have been
moving their ethnic policies in the opposite direction from that
proposed by the advocates of a second generation of ethnic policies
(e.g. Canada, Australia). Most other states are too globally
insignificant, too small or too generally problematic to be
candidates for model status, even if, rather exceptionally, they may
have a low degree of ethnic conflict.
Because proponents of depoliticizing China’s ethnic
relations contrast a U.S. model with China’s policies and have not
studied, but have overestimated the position of U.S. minorities, they
may also underestimate the position of China’s minorities. The
relationship between international knowledge, with reference to the
U.S., and domestic knowledge in China has been analyzed using a
survey and field experiment that found that empirical overestimates
of Western socioeconomic conditions drive negative opinions by
Chinese about China. Chinese who have a too “rosy” a view of
conditions in the U.S. and other Western states thus strongly tend to
have across-the-board lower evaluations of China and the Chinese
government, driven by these overestimations.349 If, as has long been
understood, many Chinese intellectuals view the U.S. government
as successfully promoting the “diversity and inclusiveness” of U.S.
society,350 that view tends to make them more negative about the
Chinese state and society and seek to replace China’s approach to
ethnic relations with perceived U.S.-style policies.
In the absence of models, proposals to depoliticize ethnic
relations in China amount to liberalist utopianism. Though these
proposals aim to benefit both minorities and Han by preserving
China’s territorial integrity, in other respects their implementation
would likely set back efforts to narrow ethnic disparities and thus
imperil prospects for ethnic peace over the long term. Rather than
diminishing collective rights for minorities, non-separatist proposals
to add to rights, attack ethnic socio-economic disparities, and
increase minority political participation and leadership might be
given serious consideration, with the aim of achieving the
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longstanding state goal of ethnic equality in fact (shishishangde
pingdeng).351
Contrary to a conception common among Chinese
intellectuals that such a course is not possible because Han would
oppose it, there may be a popular base for just such an effort in
China and apparently a wider base than exists in either the U.S. or
India.
A 2008 random sample poll in 16 countries 352 by
WorldPublicOpinion.org, the publication of the University of
Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes, asked
whether governments should make an effort to prevent
discrimination based on a person’s race or ethnicity. The 16country average was 79% agreement, while 46% of Indians, 83% of
Americans and 90% of Chinese agreed. Asked how important it is
for people of different races and ethnicities to be treated equally, the
16 country-average was that 69% said it is very important and 21%
said it is somewhat important, while 44% of Indians said it is very
important and 15% said it is somewhat important.
The
corresponding figures for the Americans were 79% and 17% and for
Chinese 90% and 8%. Queried whether government should do
more to prevent discrimination based on a person’s race or ethnicity,
the 16 country-average was 54% saying it should, while 28% of
Indians, 45% of Americans and 70% of Chinese agreed it should.
Asked whether employers should or should not be allowed to refuse
to hire a qualified person because of the person’s race or ethnicity,
the 16-country average of “shoulds” was 19% and the average of
“should nots” was 75%, while for India the “shoulds” were 30% and
“should nots” were 43%. The figures for Americans were 13% and
86% and for Chinese 10% and 88%. Queried whether government
has the responsibility to try to prevent employers from refusing to
hire someone because of the person’s race or ethnicity, the 16country average who said it does was 60%, while for India it was
27%, for the U.S. 69% and for China 77%.353
The report’s analysts concluded about Indians, Americans and
Chinese in the context of the nations surveyed that
351

Hu Qili, Speech at the Tibet Cadres Meeting Marking the 20th Anniversary of the Tibet
Autonomous Region, XH, (Aug. 31, 1985).
352
Mexico, USA, UK, France, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Azerbaijan,
Palestinian territories, Nigeria, S. Korea, China, Indonesia, and India.
353
Publics Around the World Say Governments Should Act to Prevent Racial
Discrimination,
WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG,
(2008),
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btjusticehuman_rightsra/460.php.

2014]

U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES

159

Indians stand out as the public with the weakest
levels of support for racial equality . . . Indians have
the largest number who do not support the
government taking more action to protect people
from ethnic or racial discrimination. They also
have the second-lowest number saying that their
government has the responsibility to prevent
racially or ethnically discriminatory hiring
practices . . . modest majorities of Indians say that
equal treatment of different races and ethnicities is
important . . . .
Americans widely believe that the government
should make an effort to prevent racial and ethnic
discrimination, but a majority says that the
government is already doing enough in that regard
or should not be involved in such efforts.
The Chinese are among the publics with the greatest
support for importance of equal treatment for
different races and ethnicities, second only to
Mexicans among the publics polled. China also has
the second-largest majority rejecting employers
having the right to discriminate based on race or
ethnicity, and are among the largest majorities that
favor their government making efforts to prevent
racial and ethnic discrimination.354
The data and analysis of the report consistently show that
negative attitudes toward ethnic discrimination and positive
attitudes toward taking action against it are stronger or much
stronger in China than in the U.S. and India respectively. The prime
policy question that confronts analysts of the ethnic policies in
China then is whether the Chinese government can be made to alter
its policies in ways that diminishes, rather than increase ethnic
inequality and antagonism. A significant reduction of ethnic
disparities and ethnic peace might be realized, but not through a
U.S./India model, a “cure” that is likely to kill the patient.
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